Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

Perceptions of Europe in political and economic elites: a geographical compared analysis of Germany, Spain and Poland

Elite perceptions about Europe are a very important point in order to understand the current European integration process, as well as the future perspectives for the continent. This study makes a comparison between the perceptions which political and economical elites in some European countries have about the European Union process and its mechanisms. The main goal is to identify the differences in positions of each type of elites, as well as the variations among three key countries. The database built thanks to the INTUNE (Integrated and United? A quest for Citizenship in an ¨ever closer Europe¨) Project Survey on European Elites and Masses, funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU [Contract CIT 3-CT-2005-513421] have being used. The questionnaire was applied between February and May 2007, in a total of 18 European countries. The national teams got a total of almost 2000 valid responses at European level. In the analysis we have showed some general descriptive statistics about the perception of Europe taking as a reference two dimensions of the INTUNE project: identity (attachment to the national level, the meaning of being a truly national, and the threats from Turkey that EU is facing at this moment) and representation (trust in European and national institutions, preferences for a national or an European army). The results are presented distinguishing between political (national MP’s in low chambers) and economical elites (presidents of corporations, general managers…) and, at the same time, among three countries: Germany as an original member of the European Union; Spain, incorporated in 1986; and a new member, Poland, joining the EU in 2004.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

The political consequences of unemployment

We analyze the channels by which an ill-functioning labor market changes the preferences of the people for public policy and therefore the decisions that are made. We not only discuss labour market reform but other important aspects of policy making such as the size and structure of government spending. Theclass of mechanisms that we highlight can be summarized as the very existence of unemployment generating political support for "sclerosis". This may help to explain the timid pace of reform, in particular the fact that any recovery sends them at the backfront of the political agenda, and the sometimes violent opposition generated by some measures, as we have seen mostly in France.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.