The ‘Dragon’ and the ‘Elephant’ and Global Imbalances

Global financial imbalances receive a great deal of attention in relation to the emerging economies China and India. This chapter analyzes this relation, but argues first that they are actually re-balancing the existing structural inequality in the world economy, in which for so long only the Western economies and Japan dominated economic growth and international trade, moving towards a more multi-polar world economy. China in particular, with its rapid export-led growth, has indeed been part and parcel of the emerging financial imbalances, feeding the ‘over-consumption’ in the US and using its accumulating international reserves in buying US-treasury bonds. Finance therefore is moving to the economy that ‘least needs it’. This imbalance can only be redressed if the US (and some of the other OECD countries) start saving more and consuming less (and become more competitive), with China further stimulating domestic demand (which it already did in response to the crisis). China and to a lesser extend India, as emerging large economies and a more important roles in global markets, also contribute to new imbalances, such as the influence of the insatiable appetite for resources (carbon-hydrates, minerals and bio-mass) of these relatively energy-inefficient economies, while at the same time attracting an increasing share of FDI towards them. The chapter finally raises the issue that these three mentioned imbalances make it more difficult for developing countries (except for those who are resource-rich) to get access to the necessary development finance.

Contagion or Interdependence in the recent Global Financial Crisis? An application to the stock markets using unconditional cross-market correlations

We consider stock market contagion as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country or group of countries. Under this definition we study if contagion occurred from the U.S. Financial Crisis to the rest of the major stock markets in the world by using the adjusted (unconditional) correlation coefficient approach (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) which consists of testing if average crossmarket correlations increase significantly during the relevant period of turmoil. We would not reject the null hypothesis of interdependence in favour of contagion if the increase in correlation only suggests a continuation of high linkages in all state of the world. Moreover, if contagion occurs, this would justify the intervention of the IMF and the suddenly portfolio restructuring during the period under study.

A century of global equity market correlations

In this paper, we use a unique long-run dataset of regulatory constraints on capital account openness to explain stock market correlations. Since stock returns themselves are highly volatile, any examination of what drives correlations needs to focus on long runs of data. This is particularly true since some of the short-term changes in co-movements appear to reverse themselves (Delroy Hunter 2005). We argue that changes in the co-movement of indices have not been random. Rather, they are mainly driven by greater freedom to move funds from one country to another. In related work, Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that equity correlations increase after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies from emerging countries. We examine this pattern systematically for the last century, and find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. We compare the importance of capital account openness with one main alternative explanation, the growing synchronization of economic fundamentals. We conclude that greater openness has been the single most important cause of growing correlations during the last quarter of a century, though increasingly correlated economic fundamentals also matter. In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects of greater openness appear to be so much stronger today than they were during the last era of globalization before 1914.

Risk-Return Trade-Off for European Stock Markets

This paper adopts dynamic factor models with macro-finance predictors to test the intertemporal risk-return relation for 13 European stock markets. We identify country specific, euro area, and global macro-finance factors to determine the conditional risk and return. Empirically, the risk- return trade-off is generally negative. However, a Markov switching model documents that there is time-variation in this trade-off that is linked to the state of the economy. Keywords: Risk-return trade-off; Dynamic factor model; Macro-finance predictors; European stock markets; Markov switching model JEL Classifications: C22; G11; G12; G17

The Phenomenon of international new ventures, global start-ups, and born-globals: what do we know after a decade (1993-2002) of exhaustive scientific inquiry?

In this paper, 27 studies from the last decade which deal more or less explicitly with the International New Venture, global start-up or born-global phenomenon are first identified, and then fully examined and critically assessed as a basis for obtaining an adequate view of the state-of-the-art of this increasingly important research avenue in the field of International Entrepreneurship (IE). The methodology used for this synthetic review allow us to analyze a number of recent, purposefully-chosen studies that are systematically compared along the following criteria: 1) main objective and type of research; 2) theoretical framework/s of reference, 3) methodological issues, and 4) main findings and/or conclusions. As a result of this literature review, a critical assessment follows in which the most relevant benefits and contributions as well as potential drawbacks, limitations or major discrepancies in the research activities conducted so far are discussed. Finally, some suggestions and implications are provided in the form of future research directions.

Global eriodicity and complete integrability of discrete dynamical systems

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On the number of limit cycles bifurcating from a non-global degenerated center

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Endogenous integration and welfare in complementary goods markets

This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We find out that integration is privately profitable for a high enough degree of product differentiation, that profits of the non-integrated firms decrease, and that consumer surplus need not necessarily increase when firms integrate despite the fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product differentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some circumstances.

Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: empirical evidence from experimental duopolies

We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy. Part 2. Asssessment at the EU country level.

This report is an extension and partial update of de la Fuente and Ciccone (2002). It constructs estimates of the private and social rates of return on schooling for fourteen EU countries using microeconometric estimates of Mincerian wage equations, the results of cross-country growth regressions and OECD data on educational expenditures, tax rates and social benefits. The results are used to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the optimality of observed investment patterns and educational subsidy levels.

Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy

This document is a report prepared for the DG for Employment and Social Affairs of the European Commission. It surveys the available evidence on the contribution of investment in human capital to aggregate productivity growth and on its impact on wages and other labour outcomes at the individual level. It also draws some tentative policy conclusions for an average European country.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.