How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

External sources of innovation and industry-university interaction:evidence from Spanish firms

This paper is about the firm innovation process and the cooperation of the innovative firms with other firms and public institutions. A special attention is paid to the cooperation with universities. We use the Technological Innovation Survey (TIS) from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spain) in order to obtain data for 4,159 innovative firms. Our results show that firm's cooperation activities are closely linked to the characteristics of the industry and the firm as well as to the origin of public funds for R&D activities. Key words: Innovation, universities, Spanish economy. JEL code: O31, I20, L60

The optimal behaviour of firms facing stochastic costs

This paper aims at assessing the optimal behavior of a firm facing stochastic costs of production. In an imperfectly competitive setting, we evaluate to what extent a firm may decide to locate part of its production in other markets different from which it is actually settled. This decision is taken in a stochastic environment. Portfolio theory is used to derive the optimal solution for the intertemporal profit maximization problem. In such a framework, splitting production between different locations may be optimal when a firm is able to charge different prices in the different local markets.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Who participates in R&D subsidy programs? The case of spanish manufacturing firms.

Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies to firms has produced mixed results so far. One possible explanation is that firms and project selection rules may be quite heterogeneous both across agencies and across industries, leading to different outcomes in terms of the induced additional private effort. Here we focus on the participation stage. Using a sample of Spanish firms, we test for differences across agencies and industries. Our results suggest that firms in the same industry face different hurdles to participate in different agencies’ programs, that participation patterns may reflect a combination of agency goals, and that patterns differ across high-tech and low-tech industries.

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.

Innovation and internasionalisation. A focus on the Spanish exporting firms

International markets are very competitive so innovation seems unavoidable. Some authors describe internationalisation as being an innovation of the firm. In this research these two phenomena will be studied, through a multiple case study method, focusing on the existence of a reciprocal relationship between the processes of internationalisation and innovation.

Multi-product firms and product variety

The goal of this paper is to study the role of multi-product firms in the market provision of product variety. The analysis is conducted using the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen and Riordan (2007). Firstly, we show that multi-product firms are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis single-product firms and can only emerge if economies of scope are sufficiently strong. Secondly, under duopoly product variety may be higher or lower with respect to both the first best and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. However, within a relevant range of parameter values duopolists drastically restrict their product range in order to relax price competition, and as a result product variety is far below the efficient level.

License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers' point of view.

Innovation sources and productivity in Catalonian firms: a quantile regression analysis

This paper explores the effects of two main sources of innovation -intramural and external R&D- on the productivity level in a sample of 3,267 Catalonian firms. The data set used is based on the official innovation survey of Catalonia which was a part of the Spanish sample of CIS4, covering the years 2002-2004. We compare empirical results by applying usual OLS and quantile regression techniques both in manufacturing and services industries. In quantile regression, results suggest different patterns at both innovation sources as we move across conditional quantiles. The elasticity of intramural R&D activities on productivity decreased when we move up the high productivity levels both in manufacturing and services sectors, while the effects of external R&D rise in high-technology industries but are more ambiguous in low-technology and knowledge-intensive services. JEL codes: O300, C100, O140. Keywords: Innovation sources, R&D, Productivity, Quantile regression

Productivity growth and competition in Spanish manufacturing firms: What has happened in recent years?

This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between productivity and market competition. In comparison to the economies of other European countries, the Spanish economy has been growing, while productivity growth has stagnated. Here we provide empirical evidence about the relationship between productivity and market competition from Spanish manufacturing firms at firm level between 1994 and 2004. Correcting for selection bias, our study pays special attention to the patterns of productivity growth between openness and non-openness firms. When market competition increases the effect on firms operating in domestic markets is positive but when the level of competition is high incentives to invest in innovation and productivity gains disappear. The empirical relationship between competition and productivity is an inverted U-shape, where productivity growth is highest at intermediate levels of competition. The productivity growth of firms operating in international markets is higher than that of non-openness firms, but when market competition rises they moderate their productivity growth. Our empirical results suggest that the correct competition policy in the Spanish economy should remove the barriers to competition in internal markets in order to increase the incentives for manufacturing firms to invest in innovation and productivity growth.

Small firms, growth and financial constraints

This paper analyses the impact of different sources of finance on the growth of firms. Using panel data from Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 2000-2006, we investigate the effects of internal and external finances on firm growth. In particular, we examine three dimensions of these financial sources: a) the performance of the firms’ capital structure in accordance with firm size; b) the effects of internal and external financial sources on growth performance; c) the combined effect of equity, external debt and cash flow on firm growth. We find that low-growth firms are sensitive to cash flow and short-term bank debt, while high-growth firms are more sensitive to long-term debt. Furthermore, equity capital seems to reduce barriers to external finance. Our main conclusion is that during the start-up phase, firms are unable to increase their financial leverage and so their capital structure fails to promote correct investment strategies. However, as their equity capital increases, alternative financial mechanisms, in particular long-term debt, become available, which have a positive impact on firm growth.