Quantum wire with periodic serial structure

Electron wave motion in a quantum wire with periodic structure is treated by direct solution of the Schrödinger equation as a mode-matching problem. Our method is particularly useful for a wire consisting of several distinct units, where the total transfer matrix for wave propagation is just the product of those for its basic units. It is generally applicable to any linearly connected serial device, and it can be implemented on a small computer. The one-dimensional mesoscopic crystal recently considered by Ulloa, Castaño, and Kirczenow [Phys. Rev. B 41, 12 350 (1990)] is discussed with our method, and is shown to be a strictly one-dimensional problem. Electron motion in the multiple-stub T-shaped potential well considered by Sols et al. [J. Appl. Phys. 66, 3892 (1989)] is also treated. A structure combining features of both of these is investigated

Numerical investigation of iso-spectral cavities built from trinagles

We present computational approaches as alternatives to a recent microwave cavity experiment by S. Sridhar and A. Kudrolli [Phys. Rev. Lett. 72, 2175 (1994)] on isospectral cavities built from triangles. A straightforward proof of isospectrality is given, based on the mode-matching method. Our results show that the experiment is accurate to 0.3% for the first 25 states. The level statistics resemble those of a Gaussian orthogonal ensemble when the integrable part of the spectrum is removed.

Quantum wire with periodic serial structure

Electron wave motion in a quantum wire with periodic structure is treated by direct solution of the Schrödinger equation as a mode-matching problem. Our method is particularly useful for a wire consisting of several distinct units, where the total transfer matrix for wave propagation is just the product of those for its basic units. It is generally applicable to any linearly connected serial device, and it can be implemented on a small computer. The one-dimensional mesoscopic crystal recently considered by Ulloa, Castaño, and Kirczenow [Phys. Rev. B 41, 12 350 (1990)] is discussed with our method, and is shown to be a strictly one-dimensional problem. Electron motion in the multiple-stub T-shaped potential well considered by Sols et al. [J. Appl. Phys. 66, 3892 (1989)] is also treated. A structure combining features of both of these is investigated.

Film-free laser forward printing of transparent and weakly absorbing liquids

A laser-based technique for printing transparent and weakly absorbing liquids is developed. Its principle of operation relies in the tight focusing of short laser pulses inside the liquid and close to its free surface, in such a way that the laser radiation is absorbed in a tiny volume around the beam waist, with practically no absorption in any other location along the beam path. If the absorbed energy overcomes the optical breakdown threshold, a cavitation bubble is generated, and its expansion results in the propulsion of a small fraction of liquid which can be collected on a substrate, leading to the printing of a microdroplet for each laser pulse. The technique does not require the preparation of the liquid in thin film form, and its forward mode of operation imposes no restriction concerning the optical properties of the substrate. These characteristics make it well suited for printing a wide variety of materials of interest in diverse applications. We demonstrate that the film-free laser forward printing technique is capable of printing microdroplets with good resolution, reproducibility and control, and analyze the influence of the main process parameter, laser pulse energy. The mechanisms of liquid printing are also investigated: time-resolved imaging provides a clear picture of the dynamics of liquid transfer which allows understanding the main features observed in the printed droplets.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Tomato response to a high light transmission greenhouse film

Increasing greenhouse light transmission has a positive effect not only in Northern latitudes but in Mediterranean countries as well. A greenhouse, H2, with a tetrafluoroethylene copolymer 60 microns film, (Asahi Glass company, Aflex) characterised by its high light transmission and durability was compared to another greenhouse with a co-extruded film considered as a control, H1. Tomato crop response to the increase in light during winter and summer with high temperature and light was evaluated. Light transmission in H2 remained very high in spite of the observed dust accumulation and the low angle of incidence of the winter solar radiation. Transmissivity was clearly higher for H2 (81 to 83 % throughout the season) than in the control (around 63 %). The rest of the climatic parameters were similar in both greenhouses, either in the winter or in the summer evaluations. In spite of the high solar radiation in H2, the summer temperature could be maintained at the desired levels by using evaporative cooling. Accumulated tomato yield and quality was better in the H2 greenhouse (15 % more for the winter crop and 27% more for the summer crop). Fruit size was bigger in the winter crop. As an overall conclusion, the use of high light transmissive films in Mediterranean areas is very convenient for many vegetable crops. This is valid not only in winter but in summer, provided the greenhouse has good ventilation or evaporative cooling to overcome the increase in sensible heat caused by this increase in light..

Instrumentació i control d'actuadors fluídics per a sistemes analítics: sistema de regulació d'una microbomba de precisió a mode de xeringa

En aquest projecte s’ha implementat un sistema de control per a les bombes microfluídiques LPVX de The Lee Company funcionant a mode de xeringa. El sistema consisteix en un circuit controlador basat en el microxip UDN 296 B de Allegro MicroSystems, que conté dos Ponts en H per a controlar motors pas a pas i dos mòduls de Modulació d’Amplada de Polsos (PWM), governat a partir d’un programa de control com a instrument virtual dissenyat sota l’entorn LabVIEW. El programa de control permet indicar la quantitat de volum a aspirar o dispensar per la bomba i escollir entre una execució simple o una de continuada, podent-ne controlar en aquest segona opció el temps entre execució i execució. El programa també permet visualitzar el procés mitjançant la obtenció de la imatge d’una webcam amb DirectShow. Finalment també permet el control remot de l’Instrument Virtual a través de la xarxa d’Internet.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.