Residual thermomechanical stresses in thinned-chip assemblies

A new technology for the three-dimensional (3-D) stacking of very thin chips on a substrate is currently under development within the ultrathin chip stacking (UTCS) Esprit Project 24910. In this work, we present the first-level UTCS structure and the analysis of the thermomechanical stresses produced by the manufacturing process. Chips are thinned up to 10 or 15 m. We discuss potentially critical points at the edges of the chips, the suppression of delamination problems of the peripheral dielectric matrix and produce a comparative study of several technological choices for the design of metallic interconnect structures. The purpose of these calculations is to give inputs for the definition of design rules for this technology. We have therefore undertaken a programme that analyzes the influence of sundry design parameters and alternative development options. Numerical analyses are based on the finite element method.

Thermal modeling and management in ultrathin chip stack technology

This paper presents a thermal modeling for power management of a new three-dimensional (3-D) thinned dies stacking process. Besides the high concentration of power dissipating sources, which is the direct consequence of the very interesting integration efficiency increase, this new ultra-compact packaging technology can suffer of the poor thermal conductivity (about 700 times smaller than silicon one) of the benzocyclobutene (BCB) used as both adhesive and planarization layers in each level of the stack. Thermal simulation was conducted using three-dimensional (3-D) FEM tool to analyze the specific behaviors in such stacked structure and to optimize the design rules. This study first describes the heat transfer limitation through the vertical path by examining particularly the case of the high dissipating sources under small area. First results of characterization in transient regime by means of dedicated test device mounted in single level structure are presented. For the design optimization, the thermal draining capabilities of a copper grid or full copper plate embedded in the intermediate layer of stacked structure are evaluated as a function of the technological parameters and the physical properties. It is shown an interest for the transverse heat extraction under the buffer devices dissipating most the power and generally localized in the peripheral zone, and for the temperature uniformization, by heat spreading mechanism, in the localized regions where the attachment of the thin die is altered. Finally, all conclusions of this analysis are used for the quantitative projections of the thermal performance of a first demonstrator based on a three-levels stacking structure for space application.

Disseny de cel·les digitals paramètriques per a electrònica impresa

L’objectiu d’aquest treball és el disseny i la implementació d’un conjunt de cel·les definides de forma paramètrica, i orientades a l’àmbit tecnològic emergent de l’electrònica impresa. L’ús de cel·les paramètriques en aquest entorn tecnològic poc madur, ha de permetre que els dissenys s’adaptin als canvis de regles de disseny de les tecnologies en aquest cas per estils de disseny PMOS.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

On the design of peer punishment experiments

We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Learning the ropes and embracing the rules: CFSP institutions as arenas for learning and strategic socialisation

The aim of this article is to analyse those situations in which learning and socialisation take place within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular, at the level of experts in the Council Working Groups. Learning can explain the institutional development of CFSP and changes in the foreign policies of the Member States. Some scope conditions for learning and channels of institutionalisation are identified. Socialisation, resulting from learning within a group, is perceived as a strategic action by reflective actors. National diplomats, once they arrive in Brussels, learn the new code of conduct of their Working Groups. They are embedded in two environments and faced with two logics: the European one in the Council and the national one in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The empirical evidence supports the argument that neither rational nor sociological approaches alone can account for these processes.

1st National Accessiblity Plan 2004-2012: achieving equal opportunities and full participation through design for all

According to official statistics, disabled people in Spain number 3.5 million and make up 8.8% of the Spanish population. This group of people are increasingly being recognised as members of society with equal rights, and many of their demands are gradually being transformed into solutions that benefit society as a whole. One example is improved accessibility. Accessible built environments are more human and inclusive places, as well as being easier to get around. Improved accessibility is now recognised as a requirement shared by all members of society, although it is achieved thanks to the demands of disabled people and their representatives. The 1st National Accessibility Plan is a strategic framework for action aimed at ensuring that new products, services and built environments are designed to be accessible for as many people as possible (Design for All) and that existing ones are gradually duly adapted.

Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15