A Typology of agents and subjects of regional cooperation: the experience of the Mediterranean Arch

El document és el resultat d'una investigació més àmplia sobre la construcció de l'Arc Mediterrani. El seu objectiu és posar en relleu el notable grau de desenvolupament de la cooperació regional en la matèria, a través d'una anàlisi detallada de les diferents figures institucionalitzades de cooperació territorial existents (o haver existit) a la zona. L'anàlisi s'ha dut a terme des d'un punt de vista temàtic, basat en els objectius prioritaris d'aquestes institucions. En concret, les xifres estudiades es limiten a les institucions formals o les associacions de col · laboració de caràcter específic, com ara euroregions o les agrupacions europees d'interès econòmic, entès com les figures de major institucionalització dels espais transnacionals a nivell europeu. En canvi, hem deixat de banda altres figures, com Interreg (finançat pel FEDER), ja que no són entitats correctament. Encara que de vegades els acords de cooperació establerts per als projectes d'Interreg han donat lloc a algunes de les entitats estudiades aquí.

The making of international environmental agreements

We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements when cooperation means to commit to a minimum abatement level. Each country decides whether to ratify the agreement and this latter enters into force only if it is ratified by a number of countries at least equal to some ratification threshold. We analyze the role played by ratification threshold rules and provide conditions for international environmental agreements to enter into force. We show that a large typology of agreements can enter into force among the one constituted by the grand coalition.

The Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs and the Enlargement of the European Union

This working – paper will be focused on three key issues: • How will affect the enlargement to the Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation. Especially, the absortion of Schenguen Agreements and the overall JHA by the candidate countries. • The enlargement impact over the European Immigraton Policy and the specific policies carried out by the EU Member States. The main question is the free movement of persons safeguard, in order to protect external borders of European Union. • An analysis of September, 11 attacks against U.S.A might be necessary to understand the future changes on JHA policy.

R&D cooperation and spillovers: Some empirical evidence

This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationshipbetween R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.

Are R&D collaborative agreements persistent at the firm level? Empirical evidence for the Spanish case

We provide evidence on the dynamics in firms’ R&D cooperation behaviour. Our main objective is to analyse if R&D collaborative agreements are persistent at the firm level, and in such a case, to study what are the main drivers of this phenomenon. R&D cooperation activities at the firm level can be persistent due to true state dependence, this implying that cooperating in a given period enhances the probability of doing it in the subsequent period and it can also be a consequence of firms’ individual heterogeneity, so that certain firms have certain characteristics that make them more likely to carry out technological alliances.

Are R&D collaborative agreements persistent at the firm level? Empirical evidence for the Spanish case

We provide evidence on the dynamics in firms’ R&D cooperation behaviour. Our main objective is to analyse if R&D collaborative agreements are persistent at the firm level, and in such a case, to study what are the main drivers of this phenomenon. R&D cooperation activities at the firm level can be persistent due to true state dependence, this implying that cooperating in a given period enhances the probability of doing it in the subsequent period and it can also be a consequence of firms’ individual heterogeneity, so that certain firms have certain characteristics that make them more likely to carry out technological alliances.

Intraregional trade in South America, 1913-50. Economic linkages before institutional agreements

Dejando de lado NAFTA, la integración comercial en América Latina sigue siendo muy moderada hoy en día, representando alrededor del 20% del comercio total. Lo sorprendente es que estos valores eran más altos en 1945. Esto constituye un hecho paradoxal: la integración comercial alcanzó su récord antes de la firma de acuerdos de integración comercial. En el presente trabajo se estudia el comercio intrarregional a lo largo del período de entreguerras (1913-1950) a través del análisis de cinco casos: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile y Peru. El análisis de la integración comercial en este período representa una novedad en la literatura, ya que los trabajos sobre América Latina, específicos de comercio intraregional, se centran en el período a partir de la década de 1960. El documento destaca dos conclusiones principales: a) con la excepción de los períodos de las guerras mundiales, el comercio intraregional ha sido muy modesto desde 1913 hasta la actualidad, b) en general, el comercio intrarregional repitió la especialización del comercio mundial: una alta concentración en productos de bajo valor añadido.

Intraregional trade in South America, 1913-50. Economic linkages before institutional agreements

Dejando de lado NAFTA, la integración comercial en América Latina sigue siendo muy moderada hoy en día, representando alrededor del 20% del comercio total. Lo sorprendente es que estos valores eran más altos en 1945. Esto constituye un hecho paradoxal: la integración comercial alcanzó su récord antes de la firma de acuerdos de integración comercial. En el presente trabajo se estudia el comercio intrarregional a lo largo del período de entreguerras (1913-1950) a través del análisis de cinco casos: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile y Peru. El análisis de la integración comercial en este período representa una novedad en la literatura, ya que los trabajos sobre América Latina, específicos de comercio intraregional, se centran en el período a partir de la década de 1960. El documento destaca dos conclusiones principales: a) con la excepción de los períodos de las guerras mundiales, el comercio intraregional ha sido muy modesto desde 1913 hasta la actualidad, b) en general, el comercio intrarregional repitió la especialización del comercio mundial: una alta concentración en productos de bajo valor añadido.

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

On the stability of cooperation structures

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.

Firm strategies in R&D: cooperation and participation in R&D programs

This paper presents empirical evidence on firms’ decisions to cooperate in R&D and the extent to which government sponsored R&D programs increase cooperation. Using a sample of firms from the Spanish innovation survey we jointly estimate the determinants of firm participation in R&D programs and of choice of cooperation partners. We find that (i) firms participating in national and European programs have different profiles, suggesting program complementarity; (ii) private-private and publicprivate cooperation are associated on average with firms with different characteristics, and (iii) national R&D programs seem to have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, but especially on public-private partnerships.

Seminar on territorial cooperation in Europe

Contribució al Seminari: "Les Euroregions: Experiències i aprenatges per a l’Euroregió Pirineus-Mediterrània", 15-16 de desembre de 2005