The Phenomenon of international new ventures, global start-ups, and born-globals: what do we know after a decade (1993-2002) of exhaustive scientific inquiry?

In this paper, 27 studies from the last decade which deal more or less explicitly with the International New Venture, global start-up or born-global phenomenon are first identified, and then fully examined and critically assessed as a basis for obtaining an adequate view of the state-of-the-art of this increasingly important research avenue in the field of International Entrepreneurship (IE). The methodology used for this synthetic review allow us to analyze a number of recent, purposefully-chosen studies that are systematically compared along the following criteria: 1) main objective and type of research; 2) theoretical framework/s of reference, 3) methodological issues, and 4) main findings and/or conclusions. As a result of this literature review, a critical assessment follows in which the most relevant benefits and contributions as well as potential drawbacks, limitations or major discrepancies in the research activities conducted so far are discussed. Finally, some suggestions and implications are provided in the form of future research directions.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

On the regional impact of public capital formation in Spain

The objective of this paper is to investigate, in a methodologically consistent manner, the regional effects of public capital formation and the possible existence of regional spillover effects in Spain. The empirical results are based on VAR estimates at both the aggregate and regional levels using output, employment, and private capital, as well as different measures of public capital. Empirical results suggest that public capital affects output positively at the aggregate level as well as in all but one region. For most regions, the effects of public capital installed in the region itself are important but the spillover effects induced from public capital installed elsewhere are also very important. In fact, the spillover effects account for over half of the total effects of public capital formation in Spain. Furthermore, these spillover effects have a clear geographical pattern in that they tend to be more important in the peripheral regions of the country. We also find that relative to their share of the Spanish output, the biggest beneficiaries of public capital formation are the largest regions in the country. This suggests that public capital formation has contributed to concentration of output in these regions. Finally, in terms of the effects of public capital formation on the private inputs we find that both private capital and employment are affected positively at the aggregate level as well as for most of the regions. Nevertheless, the effects on private capital seem to be larger. Also, the spillover effects are very important for private capital but not for employment. This reflects a great degree of dynamism and mobility in the capital markets as opposed to the labor markets.

Regional decomposition of CO2 emissions in the world: a cluster analysis

The purpose of this paper is to study the possible differences among countries as CO2 emitters and to examine the underlying causes of these differences. The starting point of the analysis is the Kaya identity, which allows us to break down per capita emissions in four components: an index of carbon intensity, transformation efficiency, energy intensity and social wealth. Through a cluster analysis we have identified five groups of countries with different behavior according to these four factors. One significant finding is that these groups are stable for the period analyzed. This suggests that a study based on these components can characterize quite accurately the polluting behavior of individual countries, that is to say, the classification found in the analysis could be used in other studies which look to study the behavior of countries in terms of CO2 emissions in homogeneous groups. In this sense, it supposes an advance over the traditional regional or rich-poor countries classifications .

Firm strategies in R&D: cooperation and participation in R&D programs

This paper presents empirical evidence on firms’ decisions to cooperate in R&D and the extent to which government sponsored R&D programs increase cooperation. Using a sample of firms from the Spanish innovation survey we jointly estimate the determinants of firm participation in R&D programs and of choice of cooperation partners. We find that (i) firms participating in national and European programs have different profiles, suggesting program complementarity; (ii) private-private and publicprivate cooperation are associated on average with firms with different characteristics, and (iii) national R&D programs seem to have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, but especially on public-private partnerships.

Pure motives, mixed motives and extensions of motives associated to singular surfaces

We first recall the construction of the Chow motive modelling intersection cohomology of a proper surface X and study its fundamental properties. Using Voevodsky's category of effective geometrical motives, we then study the motive of the exceptional divisor D in a non-singular blow-up of X. If all geometric irreducible components of D are of genus zero, then Voevodsky's formalism allows us to construct certain one-extensions of Chow motives, as canonical subquotients of the motive with compact support of the smooth part of X. Specializing to Hilbert-Blumenthal surfaces, we recover a motivic interpretation of a recent construction of A. Caspar.

Understanding sources of the change in international business cycles

Macroeconomic activity has become less volatile over the past three decades in most G7 economies. Current literature focuses on the characterization of the volatility reduction and explanations for this so called "moderation" in each G7 economy separately. In opposed to individual country analysis and individual variable analysis, this paper focuses on common characteristics of the reduction and common explanations for the moderation in G7 countries. In particular, we study three explanations: structural changes in the economy, changes in common international shocks and changes in domestic shocks. We study these explanations in a unified model structure. To this end, we propose a Bayesian factor structural vector autoregressive model. Using the proposed model, we investigate whether we can find common explanations for all G7 economies when information is pooled from multiple domestic and international sources. Our empirical analysis suggests that volatility reductions can largely be attributed to the decline in the magnitudes of the shocks in most G7 countries while only for the U.K., the U.S. and Italy they can partially be attributed to structural changes in the economy. Analyzing the components of the volatility, we also find that domestic shocks rather than common international shocks can account for a large part of the volatility reduction in most of the G7 countries. Finally, we find that after mid-1980s the structure of the economy changes substantially in five of the G7 countries: Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S..

Multi-product firms and product variety

The goal of this paper is to study the role of multi-product firms in the market provision of product variety. The analysis is conducted using the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen and Riordan (2007). Firstly, we show that multi-product firms are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis single-product firms and can only emerge if economies of scope are sufficiently strong. Secondly, under duopoly product variety may be higher or lower with respect to both the first best and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. However, within a relevant range of parameter values duopolists drastically restrict their product range in order to relax price competition, and as a result product variety is far below the efficient level.

Earnings management and cultural values

Using theory and empirical data from social psychology to measure for cultural differences between countries, we study the effect of individualism as defined by Hofstede (1980) and egalitarianism as defined by Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004) on earnings management. We find a significant influence of both cultural measures. In line with Licht et al. (2004), who argue that individualistic societies may be less susceptible to corruption, we find that countries scoring high on individualism tend to have lower levels of earnings management. In addition, we find that egalitarianism, defined as a society's cultural orientation with respect to intolerance for abuses of market and political power, is negatively related with earnings management. Our results are robust to different specifications and controls. The main message of this paper is that besides formal institutions, cultural differences are relevant to explain earnings management behaviour. We think that our work adds to the understanding of the importance of cultural values in managerial behaviour across countries contributing to the literature on earnings management and law and institutions.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

The Timing of labor demand

We examine the timing of firms' operations in a formal model of labor demand. Merging a variety of data sets from Portugal from 1995-2004, we describe temporal patterns of firms' demand for labor and estimate production-functions and relative labor-demand equations. The results demonstrate the existence of substitution of employment across times of the day/week and show that legislated penalties for work at irregular hours induce firms to alter their operating schedules. The results suggest a role for such penalties in an unregulated labor market, such as the United States, in which unusually large fractions of work are performed at night and on weekends.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.