Proposing a 'Consent Commons' in open education - balancing the desire for openness with the rights of people to refuse or withdraw from participation

A new 'Consent Commons' licensing framework is proposed, complementing Creative Commons, to clarify the permissions given for using and reusing clinical and non-clinical digital recordings of people (patients and non-patients) for educational purposes. Consent Commons is a sophisticated expression of ethically based 'digital professionalism', which recognises the rights of patients, carers, their families, teachers, clinicians, students and members of the public to have some say in how their digital recordings are used (including refusing or withdrawing their consent), and is necessary in order to ensure the long term sustainability of teaching materials, including Open Educational Resources (OER). Consent Commons can ameliorate uncertainty about the status of educational resources depicting people, and protect institutions from legal risk by developing robust and sophisticated policies and promoting best practice in managing their information.

Comment on "Reappraisal of experimental values of third-order elastic constants of some cubic semiconductors and metals"

In a recent paper A. S. Johal and D. J. Dunstan [Phys. Rev. B 73, 024106 (2006)] have applied multivariate linear regression analysis to the published data of the change in ultrasonic velocity with applied stress. The aim is to obtain the best estimates for the third-order elastic constants in cubic materials. From such an analysis they conclude that uniaxial stress data on metals turns out to be nearly useless by itself. The purpose of this comment is to point out that by a proper analysis of uniaxial stress data it is possible to obtain reliable values of third-order elastic constants in cubic metals and alloys. Cu-based shape memory alloys are used as an illustrative example.

Evaluation of the indication for surgical extraction of third molars according to the oral surgeon and the primary care dentist. Experience in the Master of Oral Surgery and Implantology at Barcelona University Dental School

Introduction: Third molar extraction is the most frequent procedure in oral surgery. The present study evaluates the indication of third molar extraction as established by the primary care dentist (PCD) and the oral surgeon, and compares the justification for extraction with the principal reason for patient consultation. Patients and method: A descriptive study was made of 319 patients subjected to surgical removal of a third molar in the context of the Master of Oral Surgery and Implantology (Barcelona University Dental School, Barcelona, Spain) between July 2004 and March 2005. The following parameters were evaluated: sex, age, molar, type of impaction, position according to the classifications of Pell and Gregory and of Winter, and the reasons justifying extraction. Results: The lower third molars were the most commonly extracted molars (73.7%). A total of 69.6% of the teeth were covered by soft tissues only. Fifty-six percent of the lower molars corresponded to Pell and Gregory Class IIB, while 42.1% were in the vertical position. The most common reason for patient reference to our Service of Oral Surgery on the part of the PCD was prophylactic removal (51.0% versus 46.1% in the case of the oral surgeon). Discussion and conclusions. Our results show prophylaxis to be the principal indication of third molar extraction, followed by orthodontic reasons. Regarding third molars with associated clinical symptoms or signs, infectious disease-including pericoronitis- was the pathology most often observed by the oral surgeon, followed by caries. This order of frequency was seen to invert in the case of third molars referred for extraction by the PCD. A vertical position predominated among the third molars with associated pathology

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

The law of impersonal transactions

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchangein which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect toprevious "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs byprotecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent byproperty rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement?e.g., it isthey, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicialverifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automaticbyproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, byrequiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legalcommodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocationand specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legalcommoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency?the law firstdeveloped for personal trade?and an unbalance in vested interests, asluddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

The externalisation of the asylum function in the European Union

This paper aims to identify and assess the main items in the strategy followed by the EU and its member states on the externalisation of their asylum function. First, it analyses the European harmonisation of the return to safe third countries and to countries of first asylum, which is carried out by means of readmission agreements. Second, it refers to the strategies defined by the Hague and the Stockholm programs concerning the External Aspects of the European Union Asylum Policy, on the detention centres for illegal immigrants abroad, and on the proposals for delocalisation of asylum applications processing centres beyond the EU borders. Finally, this paper considers whether the strategy of externalisation of the function of asylum sometimes lacks legitimacy, and to what extent there is a fair balance between the interests of the states and the protection of the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers.

Human Capital, the Structure of Production, and Growth

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it will however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet

This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.