Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

Polarization in the chilean party system: changes and continuities, 1990-1999

The focus of this thesis is the evolution of programmatic polarization in the post-authoritarian Chilean party system at the elite level. It shows the distance/proximity between parties located along the left-right ideological continuum on three sets of issues. The paper demonstrates that important changes have taken place in the meaning of the right and, especially, left poles. This implies convergence on socio-economic issues between parties, but persistence of differences on religious-value issues, and on issues related to the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. Distance between the poles has been reduced, and as a result the center has lost its own political space. In addition, the paper shows that the pattern followed by programmatic polarization at the elite level is explained by the authoritarian experience, the institutional framework, and socio-economic transformations. Together with this factors, the degree of negotiability of the issues and the cross-cutting nature of the cleavages have also shaped polarization.

A proposal for a new specification for a conditionally heteroskedastic variance model: the Quadratic Moving-Average Conditional Heteroskedasticity and an application to the D. Mark-U.S. dollar Exchange Rate

Ever since the appearance of the ARCH model [Engle(1982a)], an impressive array of variance specifications belonging to the same class of models has emerged [i.e. Bollerslev's (1986) GARCH; Nelson's (1990) EGARCH]. This recent domain has achieved very successful developments. Nevertheless, several empirical studies seem to show that the performance of such models is not always appropriate [Boulier(1992)]. In this paper we propose a new specification: the Quadratic Moving Average Conditional heteroskedasticity model. Its statistical properties, such as the kurtosis and the symmetry, as well as two estimators (Method of Moments and Maximum Likelihood) are studied. Two statistical tests are presented, the first one tests for homoskedasticity and the second one, discriminates between ARCH and QMACH specification. A Monte Carlo study is presented in order to illustrate some of the theoretical results. An empirical study is undertaken for the DM-US exchange rate.

The Key party in the catalan government

This paper analyzes the different compositions of the catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I find that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the advantage of the key party.

The Determinants of pricing in pharmaceuticals: are U.S. prices really higher than those of Canada?

This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to purs

The Role of model uncertainty and learning in the U.S. postwar policy response to oil prices

This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a framework that explicitly accounts for policymakers' uncertainty about the channels of transmission of oil prices into the economy. More specfically, I examine the robust response to the real price of oil that US monetary authorities would have been recommended to implement in the period 1970 2009; had they used the approach proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2005b) to incorporate model uncertainty and learning into policy decisions. In this context, I investigate the extent to which regulator' changing beliefs over different models of the economy play a role in the policy selection process. The main conclusion of this work is that, in the specific environment under analysis, one of the underlying models dominates the optimal interest rate response to oil prices. This result persists even when alternative assumptions on the model's priors change the pattern of the relative posterior probabilities, and can thus be attributed to the presence of model uncertainty itself.

Republicanismo, servidumbre y servicio doméstico

En este trabajo se exploran los condicionantes sociológicos e institucionales del mercado del servicio doméstico en Europa. Para ello se trabajó, básicamente, en tres líneas de investigación que aun están en curso. La primera, consiste en una exploración filosófica republicana, histórica y jurídica de la familia y la empresa capitalistas como instituciones que tienen una raigambre histórica común –la antigua domus, donde se desarrollaban todas las actividades productivas y reproductivas y que se caracterizaba constitutivamente por relaciones de dominación entre el propietario de los medios de producción y todos aquéllos que dependían de éste para subsistir-. Bajo el capitalismo, la familia –entendida ya como el hombre, su mujer e hijos legítimos- se constituyó en una institución eminentemente privada y las actividades desarrolladas en su seno quedaron fuera de lo que se consideró trabajo susceptible de reconocimiento económico. En este sentido, la normativa que regula al servicio doméstico como una relación laboral de carácter “especial” es un reflejo de la desvalorización socioeconómica de que ha sido objeto el trabajo reproductivo y la asociación conceptual entre la “improductividad” del ama de casa y la empleada doméstica. En la segunda línea del trabajo se exploraron las variaciones cuantitativas del mercado del servicio doméstico en Europa, cuya trayectoria presenta una forma de U entre la década de 1880 y mediados de la década de 1990. También mediante el análisis de fuentes secundarias de datos se pudieron establecer las profundas diferencias regionales que ha comportado este resurgimiento del empleo en servicios domésticos y su peso dentro de la estructura de empleo de cada sociedad. Por último, en la tercera se indagó la fluctuación histórica y geográfica de la oferta de trabajadoras domésticas en Europa, que pasó de las migraciones internas a las internacionales, coincidiendo con periodos de fuerte desigualdad económica entre las zonas expulsoras y receptoras.

Party competition in regional elections: a framework for analysis

Whilst scholars have long recognised that processes of decentralisation create new regional arenas where distinct patterns of party competition are likely to emerge, there has been little systematic analysis of the dynamics of such competition. This working paper thus proposes a framework for analysing party competition between regional branches of state-wide parties, and autonomist parties, in regional arenas. Firstly, the different strategies political parties may adopt in response to their perceptions of voter preferences and to the strategies pursued by their competitors are identified. Secondly, different factors that impact on parties' strategic choices, and which may constrain a party's ability to select electorally optimal strategies in a given political context, are proposed.

A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress

This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.

Calling vs receiving party pays: market penetration and the importance of the call externality

In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero.