Spanish pension system: population aging and immigration policy

There is a widespread consensus in the literature that, as consequence of the demographic transition, the current Spanish pension system will become unsustainable in the next decades. In this article we evaluate the sustainability of the contributory pensions' sub-system, taking into account the demographic projections by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE). A baseline scenario is projected as well as several reforms are simulated, focusing on: (i) selective immigration policy, (ii) changes in the way of setting the pensions and (iii) increase of the legal age of retirement up to 68. The main results are the following. The current system would not incur deficits until 2018, from then deficits will begin to be accumulated. The expenditure in pensions practically would double (from 8.3 % in 2005 to 17.2 % in 2050). A selective immigration policy -towards foreign young people- would help, but does not solve the long-term sustainability of the current system. A policy that combines a pensions' growth at a pace lower than productivity growth and extends the legal age of retirement up to 68 would give solvency to the system beyond 2029

A simple model of aggregate pension expenditure

This paper develops a simple model that can be used to analyze the long-term sustainability of the contributive pension system and the steady-state response of pension expenditure to changes in some key demographic and economic variables, in the characteristics of the average pensioner and in the parameters that describe how pensions are calculated in Spain as a function of workers' Social Security contribution histories.

Evaluating Spanish pension expenditure under alternativa reform scenario

In this paper we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number ofalternative reform scenarios may have on the total expenditure for publicpensions in Spain. Our quantitative findings can be summarized in twosentences. For all the reforms considered, the financial impact of themechanical effect (change in benefits) is order of magnitudes larger thanthe behavioral impact or change in behavior. For the two Spanish reforms,we find once again that their effect on the outstanding liability of theSpanish Social Security System is essentially negligible: neither themechanical nor the behavioral effects amount to much for the 1997 reform,and amount to very little for the 2002 amendment.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

The risk of divorce and household saving behavior

We analyze the impact of an increase in the risk of divorce on the savingbehaviour of married couples. From a theoretical perspective, the expected sign of theeffect is ambiguous. We take advantage of the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996as an exogenous increase in the likelihood of marital dissolution. We analyze the savingbehaviour over time of couples who were married before the law was passed. We proposea difference-in-differences approach where we use as comparison groups either marriedcouples in other European countries (not affected by the law change), or Irish familieswho did not experience a significant increase in the expected risk of divorce (such as veryreligious families, or single individuals). Our results suggest that the increase in the riskof divorce brought about by the law was followed by an increase in the propensity to saveof married couples, consistent with a rise in precautionary savings interpretation. Anincrease in the risk of marital dissolution of about 40 percent led to a 7 to 13 percent risein the proportion of married couples reporting positive savings.

Public and private saving and investment

We decompose aggregate saving and investment into its publicand private components and then document a variety of ``stylized facts''associated with saving and investment rates for a sample of15 countries over the period 1975--1989. In order to seewhether these empirical relationships are consistent with aworld of perfect capital mobility we develop a multi--countrymodel with free trade in a riskfree bond and calibrate it tothe fifteen OECD countries. We pay special attential tomodeling the fiscal policy rules. The model performsremarkably well in accounting for a wide variety of timeseries relationships. Nonetheless the model is not able to capture the crosssectional aspect of the data. In particular, the model cannot accountfor both the large cross country correlation between aggregate saving and investmentrates and the very negative cross country relationship between the public andprivate saving minus investment gaps.

Asset prices and the measurement of wealth and saving

The paper defines concepts of real wealth and saving which take into account the intertemporal index number problem that results from changing interest rates. Unlike conventional measures of real wealth, which are based on the market value of assets and ignore the index number problem, the new measure correctly reflects the changes in the welfare of households over time. An empirically operational approximation to the theoretical measure is provided and applied to US data. A major empirical finding is that US real financial wealth increased strongly in the 1980s, much more than is revealed by the market value of assets.

Pension plan funding and stock market efficiency

The paper argues that the market signifficantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans for at least five years after the first emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded firms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns, although they are value companies.

Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.

Life-time redistribution effects of the Spanish public pension system

The paper analyses the inter and intragenerational redistribution effects ofthe public pensions system in Spain. This is achieved by first comparing the expected present value of life-time income transfers (PVT) and internalrates of return (IRR) of different population cohorts. Secondly, we study the intragenerational aspects of the Spanish public pensions by calculating PVTs the IRRs for workers of different categories, grouped by earnings, gender and marital status.The results obtained show the nature of the important intergenerational effects of the Social Security System in Spain. The oldest 1935 cohort clearlybenefits in relation to the youngest 1965 cohort. This is basically due to thegap between current wages and the contribution bases established in the 60s and 70s in Spain during the early stages of the Social Security System, and to the worsening shortfall in Social Security funding, combined with the longer of life expectancy.In addition, intragenerational effects exist by income levels. For contributors who pay between the minimum and the maximum allowable contribution bases, net transfers and rates of return are higher in actuarial terms for high incomecontributors. The social security `dealï is again more profitable for highincome individuals since they contribute at the maximum basis, with respect tolow income contributors at the minimum basis. This is due to the late entry and a higher survival rate for high income contributors.The system tends to favour women, given that they generally live longer than men and this factor is only partially offset by their lower wages. Married males, given the fact that they have longer life expectancy and leave a pension to their spouse, obtain higher present net transfers too than do single contributors.We close the paper with some comments on the slight impact and moderate effects of proposals for Social Security reform and on how these may change the previously observed redistribution effects.

Portable alphas from pension mispricing

We introduce a new dynamic trading strategy based on the systematic misspricing of U.S. companies sponsoring Defined Benefit pension plans. This portfolio produces an average return of 1.51% monthly between 1989 and 2004, with a Sharpe Ratio of 0.26. The returns of the strategy are not explained by those of primary assets. These returns are not related to those of benchmarks in the alternative investments industry either. Hence, we are in the presence of a "pure alpha" strategy that can be ported into a large variety of portfolios to significantly enhance their performance.

Beyond the Toledo agreement : the intergenerational impact of the spanish pension reform

The paper examines the intergenerational impact of the Spanish public pension system after the 1997 Pension Reform Act. Working within a Generational Accounting framework, we find that maintaining the new legal setting could leave future generations with liabilities as high as 176 percent of base year GDP. As the recent reform measures have been insufficient to achieve the sustainability of the current pension system, we also analyse the impact of alternative reform strategies. Within the current pay-as-you-go setting, a further improvement to tax-benefit linkage in line with the original spirit of the Toledo Agreement is shown to yield and intergenerationally more balanced outcome,than an increase in the retirement age or an expansion of public subsidies financed through indirect taxes. Finally, we examine the generational impact of a move toward a partially funded pension system which might restore theintergenerational balance

Transitional effects of a pension system change in Spain

This paper studies the output effects, transition costs and the change in pension benefits derived from the substitution of the current unfunded pension system by a fully funded pension system financed through mandatory savings.These effects are estimated by using reduced versions of the neoclassical and endogenous growth frameworks. Because of the greater capital accumulation during the transition phase, final output increases by 23,6% (neoclassicalframework); and a 24,5-31,5% (endogenous growth framework). The initial revenue loss for the government would represent a 4,8% of the GDP, raising very slowly during the transition period. Given the new growth rates, rates of return ofphysical capital, and financial intermediation costs, we have that the capitalization pension benefits obtained by all 30-contribution-year worker would be more than twice than those that guarantee the financial sustainability of thepublic pension system

Transitional effects of a pension system change in Spain

This paper studies the output effects, transition costs and the change in pension benefits derived from the substitution of the current unfunded pension system by a fully funded pension system financed through mandatory savings.These effects are estimated by using reduced versions of the neoclassical and endogenous growth frameworks. Because of the greater capital accumulation during the transition phase, final output increases by 23,6% (neoclassicalframework); and a 24,5-31,5% (endogenous growth framework). The initial revenue loss for the government would represent a 4,8% of the GDP, raising very slowly during the transition period. Given the new growth rates, rates of return ofphysical capital, and financial intermediation costs, we have that the capitalization pension benefits obtained by all 30-contribution-year worker would be more than twice than those that guarantee the financial sustainability of thepublic pension system