Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures

We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed. Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country formation. JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects).

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Exclusive J/Psi electroproduction in a dual model

Exclusive J/Psi electroproduction is studied in the framework of the analytic S-matrix theory. The differential and integrated elastic cross sections are calculated using the modified dual amplitude with Mandelstam analyticity model. The model is applied to the description of the available experimental data and proves to be valid in a wide region of the kinematical variables s, t, and Q(2). Our amplitude can be used also as a universal background parametrization for the extraction of tiny resonance signals.

On the interplay between Q^2 and t dependence in exclusive diffractive production of real photons and vector mesons in ep collisions

We show how the familiar phenomenological way of combining the Q2 (photon virtuality) and t (squared momentum transfer) dependences of the scattering amplitude in Deeply Virtual Compton Scattering (DVCS) [1, 2] and Vector Meson Production (VMP) [2] processes can be understood in an off-mass-shell generalization of dual amplitudes with Mandelstam analyticity [3]. By comparing different approaches, we managed also to constrain the numerical values of the free parameters.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

The Effect of relationship lending on firm performance

We examine how relationship lending affects firm performance using a panel dataset of about 70,000 small and medium Spanish firms in the period 1993-2004. We model firm performance jointly with the firm's choice of the number of bank relationships. Controlling for firm fixed effects and using instrumental variables for the decision on the number of bank relationships, we find that firms maintaining exclusive bank relationships have lower profitability. The result is consistent with the view that banks appropriate most of the value generated through close relationships with its borrowers as long as they do not face competition from other lenders.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Women at home, at school and in the factory. The particular discourse of domesticity done by the Spanish Escuela Economista (1861-1909)

The texts by the Spanish Economist School (second half of the 19th century) contain an assessment of the role of women in the economy and society that is transgressor in front of the prevailing discourse that defended a unique and exclusive role for all women: being at home and a mother. Most members of that economic trend defended female work in the factories, basing themselves on wage arguments and even asked for a professional training for those who in many cases could not even write and read for the fact of being a woman. The texts of those economists give new ideas about the economic and social role of women in a Spain dominated by a discourse that denied the necessity of female work for the working families.

Jordi Rubió i Balaguer, una visió personal

Treball de recerca realitzat per un alumne d'ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l'any 2009. Aquest treball ha tingut dos objectius principals: conèixer la figura de Jordi Rubió i Balaguer,erudit català polifacètic (bibliotecari, professor, historiador de la literatura catalana i de la cultura en general), i escriure sobre el que va aconseguir per després donar-lo a conèixer a tothom. Un dels punts més interessants del treball ha estat donar una nova visió sobre la seva figura, explicant el context i l’època en què visqué i enregistrant les converses entre l’autor i la seva àvia, filla de J.Rubió, en què recorda anècdotes i impressions del passat. Aquestes gravacions i les cartes trobades a l’Arxiu Rubió són inèdites i exclusives d'aquest treball. Al principi, s’hi explica la família de J.R.B i els seus precedents, seguit de la formació acadèmica i la maduració a Barcelona, Madrid i Hamburg. Després d’això, es parla del context polític i l’obra cultural dels anys de la Mancomunitat (1914-1925), com també d’algunes institucions com la Biblioteca de Catalunya, l'Escola de Bibliotecàries i les Biblioteques Populars, que dirigí. Abans de parlar de la seva vida personal, es fa referència a la situació cultural de Catalunya durant els anys 1925-1939. Tot això, per entendre la vida d’aquest home extraordinari que treballà tenaçment i amb vocació de servei al país durant tota la seva vida, si bé el 1939 va ser desposseït dels seus càrrecs per la dictadura franquista. Aquest treball se centra en el període anterior a 1939, durant el qual Rubió va dur una activitat frenètica.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Crecimiento, instituciones e hidrocarburos : el proyecto petrolero mexicano en perspectiva histórica comparada (1938-2000)

En este trabajo se analiza la política petrolera mexicana durante el período 1938-2000 y su aportación al crecimiento económico mexicano. La orientación de la producción petrolera permite distinguir dos modelos de gestión de la industria petrolera. El primero de ellos; entre 1938-1976 tuvo por finalidad el aprovisionamiento energético del mercado interior a bajos precios. El segundo a partir de 1976 orientado hacia la exportación y la captura de la renta petrolera internacional. Esta ruptura en la política petrolera asociada constituye un caso interesante en sí mismo porque permite comparar los efectos de dos políticas totalmente opuestas sobre el crecimiento económico y sobre el desempeño de la propia industria petrolera en un país donde el Estado tiene derechos de propiedad exclusivos sobre el sector petrolero. Por ello, se aborda el tema como una problemática institucional que toma en cuenta tanto las características internas de México como la dinámica del mercado petrolero internacional. Se incide en el hecho de que el Estado mexicano ha utilizado a la industria petrolera y; concretamente los recursos que ésta genera no sólo como un instrumento para favorecer el crecimiento económico del país sino también para mantener el control del poder político frente a la élite económica. Así el inmovilismo institucional; la falta de ingresos e inversiones propias y el comportamiento rentista del Estado parecen haber condenado al sector petrolero mexicano al atraso y la ineficiencia. De este modo; se focaliza en las interrelaciones entre las instituciones económicas y políticas como elemento explicativo del por qué la industria petrolera no ha logrado convertirse en un elemento dinamizador del crecimiento económico mexicano en el largo plazo.

El comportamiento penalmente relevante en el delito de defraudación tributaria: una propuesta político-criminal

El sistema tributario es fundamental en el Estado social y democrático de Derecho, pues el ejercicio y efectivo disfrute de muchos derechos fundamentales depende del correcto funcionamiento de la actividad tributaria. Además de esto, la situación económica actual demanda una adecuada política en contra del fraude tributario, lo que necesariamente implica analizar si el modelo penal vigente es el más adecuado para enfrentar el fraude fiscal. Teniendo en cuenta que muchas de las características de la criminalidad tributaria no son exclusivas de un país, pues ésta trasciende habitualmente las fronteras de los países por medio del recurso a empresas multinacionales o la localización de empresas en “paraísos fiscales”, el análisis del fraude tributario no debe limitarse al examen jurídico del modelo legislativo español, debiendo trascender a un estudio de política criminal que vincula consideraciones criminológicas y jurídicas. En consecuencia, en esta investigación se propone un análisis que no se reduce a los debates exclusivamente jurídicos. Se busca, además, efectuar un examen que tenga por fundamento una perspectiva criminológica y de Law in action a fin de evaluar críticamente la respuesta a la criminalidad tributaria por parte del modelo de regulación penal vigente en España. Esta orientación permitirá una más amplia comprensión del fenómeno de la criminalidad tributaria, así como de las categorías jurídicas adecuadas político criminalmente para su prevención. Este estudio interdisciplinario nos conducirá, al final de la investigación, tanto a proponer la interpretación del modelo de legislación penal vigente, como una reforma al mismo que pretenda solucionar algunos de los problemas de prevención que a lo largo de la investigación se señalan.

PHOTO STORE : Galeria virtual d'imatges

Ofereix a l'usuari la possibilitat de crear la seva pròpia galeria virtual d'imatges, i de classificar-les en àlbums dividits en categories per oferir una catalogació molt més específica. Els àlbums els subdividim públics per aque qualsevol visitant del web (registrat o no) pugui tenir la possibilitat d'accedir-hi,visualitzar i imprimir les fotos; o privats per a l'ús exclusiu de l'usuari que els publica.

OpenSpires : Opening up Oxford like never before

Oxford University learning technologies group offer a model for effective practice in creating and using OER in research-led teaching environments where academic practice includes dissemination of research which aids/supplements teaching but is not primarily designed as a teaching resource. The University is perceived by many people to be an exclusive institution. It is certainly unique and complex, with characteristics and traditions established over 900 years. An Oxford education offers an exciting combination of privilege and open-mindedness. The role and sustainability of open education technologies in this environment is subtle. Any strategy to effectively encourage the uptake of OERs must be informed by original thinking and reflection about the culture of the organisation. The OpenSpires project was a successful initiative to establish a sustainable set of policies and workflows that would allow departments from across the University of Oxford to regularly publish high quality open content material for global reuse.