Bubbles and capital flows

This paper presents a stylized model of international trade and asset price bubbles. Its central insight is that bubbles tend to appear and expand in countries where productivity is low relative to the rest of the world. These bubbles absorb local savings, eliminating inefficient investments and liberating resources that are in part used to invest in high productivity countries. Through this channel, bubbles act as a substitute for international capital flows, improving the international allocation of investment and reducing rate-of-return differentials across countries. This view of asset price bubbles could eventually provide a simple account of some real world phenomenae that have been difficult to model before, such as the recurrence and depth of financial crises or their puzzling tendency to propagate across countries.

Why are capital flows so much more volatile in emerging than in developed countries?

The standard deviations of capital flows to emerging countries are 80 percent higher than those to developed countries. First, we show that very little of this difference can be explained by more volatile fundamentals or by higher sensitivity to fundamentals. Second, we show that most of the difference in volatility can be accounted for by three characteristics of capital flows: (i) capital flows to emerging countries are more subject to occasional large negative shocks ( crises ) than those to developed countries, (ii) shocks are subject to contagion, and (iii) the most important one shocks to capital flows to emerging countries are more persistent than those to developed countries. Finally, we study a number of country characteristics to determine which are most associated with capital flow volatility. Our results suggest that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets, weak institutions, and low income per capita, are all associated with capital flow volatility.

Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents,dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show thatgross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. Whenforeigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flowsare also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domesticagents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchmentin both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for differenttypes of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations drivingcapital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent withcrises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under thepresence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.

Financial reforms and capital flows: Insights from general equilibrium

As a result of debt enforcement problems, many high-productivity firms in emergingeconomies are unable to pledge enough future profits to their creditors and this constrains thefinancing they can raise. Many have argued that, by relaxing these credit constraints, reformsthat strengthen enforcement institutions would increase capital flows to emerging economies. Thisargument is based on a partial equilibrium intuition though, which does not take into account theorigin of any additional resources that flow to high-productivity firms after the reforms. We showthat some of these resources do not come from abroad, but instead from domestic low-productivityfirms that are driven out of business as a result of the reforms. Indeed, the resources released bythese low-productivity firms could exceed those absorbed by high-productivity ones so that capitalflows to emerging economies might actually decrease following successful reforms. This resultprovides a new perspective on some recent patterns of capital flows in industrial and emergingeconomies.

Free Flows, Limited Diversification: Explaining the Fall and Rise of Stock Market Correlations, 1890-2001

Using a new dataset on capital account openness, we investigate why equity return correlations changed over the last century. Based on a new, long-run dataset on capital account regulations in a group of 16 countries over the period 1890-2001, we show that correlations increase as financial markets are liberalized. These findings are robust to controlling for both the Forbes-Rigobon bias and global averages in equity return correlations. We test the robustness of our conclusions, and show that greater synchronization of fundamentals is not the main cause of increasing correlations. These results imply that the home bias puzzle may be smaller than traditionally claimed.

Convertibility, currency controls and the cost of capital in Western Europe, 1950-1999

For most of the post-war period, Europe s capital markets remained largely closed to international capital flows. Thispaper explores the costs of this policy. Using an event-study methodology, I examine the extent to which restrictions ofcurrent and capital account convertibility affected stock returns. The delayed introduction of full currency convertibilityincreased the cost of capital. Also, a string of measures designed to reduce capital mobility before the ultimate collapseof the Bretton Woods System had considerable negative effects. These findings offer an explanation for the mountingevidence suggesting that capital account liberalization facilitates growth.

Las apropiaciones de la ciudad a la hora de la globalización: las estrategias del capital ruso y chino en el mercado inmobiliario de Barcelona

[spa]Con la internacionalización del mercado inmobiliario de las ciudades, originariamente local, se han generado nuevos flujos de capital que han reforzado a nivel mundial el segundo circuito. Barcelona, por lo menos desde 1992 no ha sido ajena a ello. Los últimos capitales llegados proceden de antiguos países socialistas, especialmente de la República Popular de China y de Rusia, con estrategias distintas de localización, más concentradas las chinas. Las consecuencias de estas nuevas apropiaciones del espacio urbano se sienten en la restricción del acceso al mercado de la vivienda por parte de los ciudadanos y en la formación de una Chinatown de modelo europeo.

Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance

We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.

Financial Crises and International Portfolio Dynamics

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.

Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization

During the last few decades, many emerging markets have lifted restrictions on cross-borderfinancial transactions. The conventional view was that this would allow these countries to: (i)receive capital inflows from advanced countries that would finance higher investment and growth;(ii) insure against aggregate shocks and reduce consumption volatility; and (iii) accelerate thedevelopment of domestic financial markets and achieve a more efficient domestic allocationof capital and better sharing of individual risks. However, the evidence suggests that thisconventional view was wrong.In this paper, we present a simple model that can account for the observed effects of financialliberalization. The model emphasizes the role of imperfect enforcement of domestic debts and theinteractions between domestic and international financial transactions. In the model, financialliberalization might lead to different outcomes: (i) domestic capital flight and ambiguous effectson net capital flows, investment, and growth; (ii) large capital inflows and higher investmentand growth; or (iii) volatile capital flows and unstable domestic financial markets. The modelshows how these outcomes depend on the level of development, the depth of domestic financialmarkets, and the quality of institutions.

A century of global equity market correlations

In this paper, we use a unique long-run dataset of regulatory constraints on capital account openness to explain stock market correlations. Since stock returns themselves are highly volatile, any examination of what drives correlations needs to focus on long runs of data. This is particularly true since some of the short-term changes in co-movements appear to reverse themselves (Delroy Hunter 2005). We argue that changes in the co-movement of indices have not been random. Rather, they are mainly driven by greater freedom to move funds from one country to another. In related work, Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that equity correlations increase after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies from emerging countries. We examine this pattern systematically for the last century, and find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. We compare the importance of capital account openness with one main alternative explanation, the growing synchronization of economic fundamentals. We conclude that greater openness has been the single most important cause of growing correlations during the last quarter of a century, though increasingly correlated economic fundamentals also matter. In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects of greater openness appear to be so much stronger today than they were during the last era of globalization before 1914.

Country portfolios

Capital flows to developing countries are small and are mostly take the form of loans rather than direct foreign investment. We build a simple model of North-South capital flows that highlights the interplay between diminishing returns, production risk and sovereign risk. This model generates a set of country portfolios and a world distribution of capital stocks that resemble those in the data.