HIV-related discrimination in Sub-Sahran Africa: Explanatory characteristics and consequences on employment and HIV-testing

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The sources of the union wage gap

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Statistics as a basis for discrimination in the insurance business

The European Court of Justice has held that as from 21 December 2012 insurers may no longer charge men and women differently on the basis of scientific evidence that is statistically linked to their sex, effectively prohibiting the use of sex as a factor in the calculation of premiums and benefits for the purposes of insurance and related financial services throughout the European Union. This ruling marks a sharp turn away from the traditional view that insurers should be allowed to apply just about any risk assessment criterion, so long as it is sustained by the findings of actuarial science. The naïveté behind the assumption that insurers’ recourse to statistical data and probabilistic analysis, given their scientific nature, would suffice to keep them out of harm’s way was exposed. In this article I look at the flaws of this assumption and question whether this judicial decision, whilst constituting a most welcome landmark in the pursuit of equality between men and women, has nonetheless gone too far by saying too little on the million dollar question of what separates admissible criteria of differentiation from inadmissible forms of discrimination.

What hides behind the fixed-term contracts wage gap?

In Portugal, about 20% of full-time workers are employed under a fixed-term contract. Using a rich longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, with more than 20 million observations and covering the 2002-2012 period, we confirm the common idea that fixed-term contracts are not desirable when compared to permanent ones, by estimating a conditional wage gap of -1.7 log points. Then, we evaluate the sources of that wage penalty by combining a three way high-dimensional fixed effects model with the decomposition of Gelbach (2014), in which the three dimensions considered are the worker’s unobserved ability, the firm’s compensation wage policy and the job title effect. It is shown that the average worker with a fixed-term contract is less productive than his/her permanent counterparts, explaining -3.92 log points of the FTC wage penalty. Additionally, the sorting of workers into lower-paid job titles is also responsible for -0.59 log points of the wage gap. Surprisingly, we found that the allocation of workers among firms mitigates the existing wage penalty (in 4.23 log points), as fixed-term workers are concentrated into firms with a more generous compensation policy. Finally, following Figueiredo et al. (2014), we further control for the worker-firm match characteristics and reach the conclusion that fixed-term employment relationships have an overrepresentation of low quality worker-firm matches, explaining 0.65 log points of the FTC wage penalty.

Insurance segmentation as unfair discrimination: what to expect next in the wake of Test-Achats

Proceedings of the 16th Annual Conference organized by the Insurance Law Association of Serbia and German Foundation for International Legal Co-Operation (IRZ), entitled "Insurance law, governance and transparency: basics of the legal certainty" Palic Serbia, 17-19 April 2015.

Wage adjustments under extreme downward nominal wage rigidity

Using a rich and highly accurate dataset for Portugal spanning from 1986 to 2013, this paper analyzes the determinants of downward nominal wage rigidity, mainly focusing on macroeconomic factors. The data supports the hypothesis that recessionary periods alongside with low in ation contribute to a higher degree of wage rigidity, as measured by the incidence of nominal wage freezes. It is further highlighted how this lack of wage adjustments con- tributed to an increase in labor costs which culminated in a wage markup of 6-7%. This paper, thus seems to corroborate the argument that low in ation did exacerbated the downward in exibility of (real) wages after the Great Recession.