New quasi-orthogonal BCH-derived sequences for CDMA applications

European Transactions on Telecommunications, vol. 18

Chaînes opératoires and resource-exploitation strategies in chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) nut cracking

Journal of Human Evolution, V. 55, pp. 148-163

An overview of the higher level classification of Pucciniomycotina based on combined analyses of nuclear large and small subunit rDNA sequences

Mycologia, Vol. 98, nº6

A stratigraphic framework for the Miocene from the lower Tagus Basin (Lisbon, Setúbal Península, Portugal) Depositional sequences, biostratigraphy and isotopic ages

Rev. Soc. Geol. España, 12(1), ano 1999

Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.