From Consciousness to Knowledge – The Explanatory Power of Revelation

Epistemology in philosophy of mind is a difficult endeavor. Those who believe that our phenomenal life is different from other domains suggest that self-knowledge about phenomenal properties is certain and therefore privileged. Usually, this so called privileged access is explained by the idea that we have direct access to our phenomenal life. This means, in contrast to perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is non-inferential. It is widely believed that, this kind of directness involves two different senses: an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. Proponents of this view often claim that this is due to the fact that we are acquainted with our current experiences. The acquaintance thesis, therefore, is the backbone in justifying privileged access. Unfortunately the whole approach has a profound flaw. For the thesis to work, acquaintance has to be a genuine explanation. Since it is usually assumed that any knowledge relation between judgments and the corresponding objects are merely causal and contingent (e.g. in perception), the proponent of the privileged access view needs to show that acquaintance can do the job. In this thesis, however, I claim that the latter cannot be done. Based on considerations introduced by Levine, I conclude that this approach involves either the introduction of ontologically independent properties or a rather obscure knowledge relation. A proper explanation, however, cannot employ either of the two options. The acquaintance thesis is, therefore, bound to fail. Since the privileged access intuition seems to be vital to epistemology within the philosophy of mind, I will explore alternative justifications. After discussing a number of options, I will focus on the so called revelation thesis. This approach states that by simply having an experience with phenomenal properties, one is in the position to know the essence of those phenomenal properties. I will argue that, after finding a solution for the controversial essence claim, this thesis is a successful replacement explanation which maintains all the virtues of the acquaintance account without necessarily introducing ontologically independent properties or an obscure knowledge relation. The overall solution consists in qualifying the essence claim in the relevant sense, leaving us with an appropriate ontology for phenomenal properties. On the one hand, this avoids employing mysterious independent properties, since this ontological view is physicalist in nature. On the other hand, this approach has the right kind of structure to explain privileged self-knowledge of our phenomenal life. My final conclusion consists in the claim that the privileged access intuition is in fact veridical. It cannot, however, be justified by the popular acquaintance approach, but rather, is explainable by the controversial revelation thesis.

Lovers and Madmen: The Μανία-Φρονεῖν Opposition in Plato’s Phaedrus

In this thesis we propose to examine the first half of the Phaedrus (sc. until the end of the palinode) in light of the opposition between the notions of μανία and φρονεῖν, as they are explicitly and implicitly presented in the erotic speeches. These are read in dialogue with what we have designated as the “implicit speech” or “speeches”, i.e., the plurality of conceptions regarding ἔρως, μανία and φρονεῖν that were part of Ancient Greek culture. Our reading of the two speeches against ἔρως, Lysias’ and Socrates’ first speech, engages with this cultural background, and extracts a conception of μανία and φρονεῖν with which the palinode will primarily confront. Our reading of the palinode divides it into two sections: the first, the presentation of the first three kinds of beneficial μανία; the second, the mythical narrative that deals with erotic μανία. We emphasise the existence of a wide gulf between these two moments in terms of their ontological, theological and anthropological conceptions. The second section of the palinode is revolutionary not only in contrast with the “implicit speech” and the speeches against ἔρως, but also in contrast with the very beginning of the palinode – which preserves many of the conceptions and assumptions found in the previous speeches and in the cultural tradition. It is in order to explain the foundation, meaning and significance of this gulf that we explore and discuss the notion of ὑπόθεσις and its role as an implicit operator in the Phaedrus. From our reading of the second part of the palinode, it is clear how the introduction of the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος brings about a radical revision of the perspectives on the nature of reality and on human nature and condition that were implicit in the previous speeches and in the first part of the palinode. We show that the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος corresponds to the projection of a multiplicity of cognitive and desiderative requirements that our normal perspective demands, but cannot possibly satisfy. In other words, our perspective is shown to be living beyond its means, yearning for something that by far exceeds what it can get in its de facto condition: the superlative. This results in a major revision of the understanding of φρονεῖν and μανία – a revision that challenges the traditional understanding of these two notions as binary opposites, thereby revealing a much more complex landscape.