Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

Unemployment, technological revolution and competition from developing countries

Unemployment is probably the most important social problem of our times in the rich industrial world. There are 35 million people unemployed in OECD countries(about 8,5%): the situation however differs between the USA and Europe. In this paper we will discuss the reasons for suche a difference.

Competition policy costs to firms

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and oligopolistic competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.

The patent expiry as a major inflection point in a branded Rx drug's life and strategies to counter generic competition - exemplified at Pfizer's blockbuster drug Lipitor in the USA

A large number of expensive, but highly profitable branded prescription drugs will go off-patent in the USA between 2011 and 2015. Their revenues are crucial to fund the immense costs associated with the development of an innovative drug. The rising cost pressure on pharmaceutical stakeholders has increased the demand for more affordable medications, as provided by the branded drug's generic counterpart. Yet, research based incumbents are moving beyond the traditional late lifecycle strategies and deploy more aggressive tactics in order to protect their brands, as seen with Pfizer's Lipitor!. It is doubtful, whether these efforts will help the blockbuster business model to resist current market conditions.

Portuguese commercial banking: An assessment of competition in the 1960-2013 period

Strong consolidation is one of the most evident developments of banking markets around the world in recent decades. This change is raising questions on how and to what an extent competition is affected by the expansion of the largest banks. The aim of the present study is to measure the degree of competition in the Portuguese commercial banking market in the long-run, during the period ranging from1960 to 2013, by using the non-structural model developed by Panzar and Rosse. The main findings are that the Portuguese banking system, despite the legal restrictions in place, operated mostly in a market with some degree of competition and, at some points in time, presented some interesting competitive features. More recently, it has evolved into functioning as a cartel.

Competition effects from patient mobility in the European Union

This paper studies the effects of reimbursement for medical tourism within the European Union. We use a spatial competition framework to study the effects on prices, qualities and patient flows between two countries. Patient mobility increases with the implementation of reimbursement mechanisms. The resulting equilibria in prices and qualities depend on the rule of reimbursements and possible differences in country specific parameters. Soft budget constraints that public providers may have, pose a competitive advantage over private providers and divert demand toward the former. Supranational coordination concerning soft budgets constraints is needed to address the potentially detrimental effects on aggregate welfar

Competition policy costs to firms

The existence of competition policy forces companies to adjust their behaviour. This is also costly. Using a database from a company on contracts, I will try to estimate if a specific competition policy disposition, supply contracts cannot be longer than 60 months, has costs for the coffee suppliers operating in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market. The estimation method used in this paper will be OLS. The results suggest that limiting the duration of exclusivity contracts to 60 months can be harmful to the coffee suppliers and it can even seriously affect the market functioning. Key