Engineered MRI nanoprobes based on superparamagnetic iron oxide nanoparticles

This project aimed to engineer new T2 MRI contrast agents for cell labeling based on formulations containing monodisperse iron oxide magnetic nanoparticles (MNP) coated with natural and synthetic polymers. Monodisperse MNP capped with hydrophobic ligands were synthesized by a thermal decomposition method, and further stabilized in aqueous media with citric acid or meso-2,3-dimercaptosuccinic acid (DMSA) through a ligand exchange reaction. Hydrophilic MNP-DMSA, with optimal hydrodynamic size distribution, colloidal stability and magnetic properties, were used for further functionalization with different coating materials. A covalent coupling strategy was devised to bind the biopolymer gum Arabic (GA) onto MNPDMSA and produce an efficient contrast agent, which enhanced cellular uptake in human colorectal carcinoma cells (HCT116 cell line) compared to uncoated MNP-DMSA. A similar protocol was employed to coat MNP-DMSA with a novel biopolymer produced by a biotechnological process, the exopolysaccharide (EPS) Fucopol. Similar to MNP-DMSA-GA, MNP-DMSA-EPS improved cellular uptake in HCT116 cells compared to MNP-DMSA. However, MNP-DMSA-EPS were particularly efficient towards the neural stem/progenitor cell line ReNcell VM, for which a better iron dose-dependent MRI contrast enhancement was obtained at low iron concentrations and short incubation times. A combination of synthetic and biological coating materials was also explored in this project, to design a dynamic tumortargeting nanoprobe activated by the acidic pH of tumors. The pH-dependent affinity pair neutravidin/iminobiotin, was combined in a multilayer architecture with the synthetic polymers poy-L-lysine and poly(ethylene glycol) and yielded an efficient MRI nanoprobe with ability to distinguish cells cultured in acidic pH conditions form cells cultured in physiological pH conditions.

Opening Pousada da Serra da Estrela in Covilhã: A two-way impact analysis - Interacting with public agents

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Novel insights into the action of antimicrobial agents against human pathogens

Dissertation presented to obtain the Ph.D degree in Biochemistry

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

A new credit monitoring framework for agents' networks

The purpose of this work is to develop a practicable approach for Telecom firms to manage the credit risk exposition to their commercial agents’ network. Particularly it will try to approach the problem of credit concession to clients’ from a corporation perspective and explore the particular scenario of agents that are part of the commercial chain of the corporation and therefore are not end-users. The agents’ network that served as a model for the presented study is composed by companies that, at the same time, are both clients and suppliers of the Telecommunication Company. In that sense the credit exposition analysis must took into consideration all financial fluxes, both inbound and outbound. The current strain on the Financial Sector in Portugal, and other peripheral European economies, combined with the high leverage situation of most companies, generates an environment prone to credit default risk. Due to these circumstances managing credit risk exposure is becoming increasingly a critical function for every company Financial Department. The approach designed in the current study combined two traditional risk monitoring tools: credit risk scoring and credit limitation policies. The objective was to design a new credit monitoring framework that is more flexible, uses both external and internal relationship history to assess risk and takes into consideration commercial objectives inside the agents’ network. Although not explored at length, the blueprint of a Credit Governance model was created for implementing the new credit monitoring framework inside the telecom firm. The Telecom Company that served as a model for the present work decided to implement the new Credit Monitoring framework after this was presented to its Executive Commission.