Interaction of malaria parasites with host late endocytic and autophagic pathways is essential for Plasmodium liver stage development

RESUMO: A Malária é causada por parasitas do género Plasmodium, sendo a doença parasitária mais fatal para o ser humano. Apesar de, durante o século passado, o desenvolvimento económico e a implementação de diversas medidas de controlo, tenham permitido erradicar a doença em muitos países, a Malária continua a ser um problema de saúde grave, em particular nos países em desenvolvimento. A Malária é transmitida através da picada de uma fêmea de mosquito do género Anopheles. Durante a picada, os esporozoítos são injetados na pele do hospedeiro, seguindo-se a fase hepática e obrigatória do ciclo de vida. No fígado, os esporozoítos infetam os hepatócitos onde se replicam, dentro de um vacúolo parasitário (VP) e de uma forma imunitária silenciosa, em centenas de merozoitos. Estas novas formas do parasita são as responsáveis por infetar os eritrócitos, iniciando a fase sanguínea da doença, onde se os primeiros sintomas se manifestam, tais como a característica febre cíclica. A fase hepática da doença é a menos estudada e compreendida. Mais ainda, as interações entre o VP e os organelos da células hospedeira estão ainda pouco caracterizados. Assim, neste estudo, as interações entre os organelos endocíticos e autofágicos da célula hospedeira e o VP foram dissecados, observando-se que os anfisomas, que são organelos resultantes da intersecção do dois processos de tráfego intracelular, interagem com o parasita. Descobrimos que a autofagia tem também uma importante função imunitária durante a fase hepática inicial, ao passo, que durante o desenvolvimento do parasita, já numa fase mais tardia, o parasita depende da interação com os endossomas tardios e anfisomas para crescer. Vesiculas de BSA, EGF e LC3, foram, também, observadas dentro do VP, sugerindo que os parasitas são capazes de internalizar material endocítico e autofágico do hospedeiro. Mais ainda, mostramos que esta interação depende da cinase PIKfyve, responsável pela conversão do fosfoinositidio-3-fosfato no fosfoinositidio-3,5-bifosfato, uma vez que inibindo esta cinase o parasita não é capaz de crescer normalmente. Finalmente, mostramos que a proteína TRPML1, uma proteína efetora do fosfoinositidio-3,5-bifosfato, e envolvida no processo de fusão das membranas dos organelos endocíticos e autofágicos, também é necessária para o crescimento do parasita. Desta forma, o nosso estudo sugere que a membrana do VP funde com vesiculas endocíticas e autofágicas tardias, de uma forma dependente do fositidio-3,5-bifosfato e do seu effetor TRPML1, permitindo a troca de material com a célula hospedeira. Concluindo, os nossos resultados evidenciam que o processo autofágico que ocorre na célula hospedeira tem um papel duplo durante a fase hepática da malaria. Enquanto numa fase inicial os hepatócitos usam o processo autofágico como forma de defesa contra o parasita, já durante a fase de replicação o VP funde com vesiculas autofágicas e endocíticas de forma a obter os nutrientes necessários ao seu desenvolvimento.--------- ABSTRACT: Malaria, which is caused by parasites of the genus Plasmodium, is the most deadly parasitic infection in humans. Although economic development and the implementation of control measures during the last century have erradicated the disease from many areas of the world, it remains a serious human health issue, particularly in developing countries. Malaria is transmitted by female mosquitoes of the genus Anopheles. During the mosquito blood meal, Plasmodium spp. sporozoites are injected into the skin dermis of the vertebrate host, followed by an obligatory liver stage. Upon entering the liver, Plasmodium parasites infect hepatocytes and silently replicate inside a host cell-derived parasitophorous vacuole (PV) into thousands of merozoites. These new parasite forms can infect red blood cells initiating the the blood stage of the disease which shows the characteristic febrile malaria episodes. The liver stage is the least characterized step of the malaria infection. Moreover, the interactions between the Plasmodium spp. PV and the host cell trafficking pathways are poorly understood. We dissected the interaction between Plasmodium parasites and the host cell endocytic and autophagic pathways and we found that both pathways intersect and interconnect in the close vicinity of the parasite PV, where amphisomes are formed and accumulate. Interestingly, we observed a clearance function for autophagy in hepatocytes infected with Plasmodium berghei parasites at early infection times, whereas during late liver stage development late endosomes and amphisomes are required for parasite growth. Moreover, we found the presence of internalized BSA, EGF and LC3 inside parasite vacuoles, suggesting that the parasites uptake endocytic and autophagic cargo. Furthermore, we showed that the interaction between the PV and host traffic pathways is dependent on the kinase PIKfyve, which converts the phosphoinositide PI(3)P into PI(3,5)P2, since PIKfyve inhibition caused a reduction in parasite growth. Finally, we showed that the PI(3,5)P2 effector protein TRPML1, which is involved in late endocytic and autophagic membrane fusion, is also required for parasite development. Thus, our studies suggest that the parasite parasitophorous vacuole membrane (PVM) is able to fuse with late endocytic and autophagic vesicles in a PI(3,5)P2- and TRPML1-dependent manner, allowing the exchange of material between the host cell and the parasites, necessary for the rapid development of the latter that is seen during the liver stage of infection. In conclusion, we present evidence supporting a specific and essential dual role of host autophagy during the course of Plasmodium liver infection. Whereas in the initial hours of infection the host cell uses autophagy as a cell survival mechanism to fight the infection, during the replicative phase the PV fuses with host autophagic and endocytic vesicles to obtain nutrients required for parasite growth.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).