O abuso de informação privilegiada (insider trading)

In the stock market, information takes on special relevance, due to the market’s permanent updating and the great fluidity of information existent therein. Just as in any other negotiations, the party with the better information has a bargaining advantage, as it is able to make more advantageous business decisions. However, unlike most other markets, the proper functioning of the stock market is greatly dependent on investors’ trust in the market itself. As such, if there are investors who, due to any condition they possess or office they hold, have access to relevant information which is not accessible to the general public, distrust is bred within the market and, consequently, investment is lessened. Thus, there is a need to prevent those who hold privileged information from using it in abusive ways. In Portugal, abuse of privileged information is set out and punished criminally in Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code (‘Código dos Valores Mobiliários’). In this dissertation, I have set out, firstly, to analyze the inherent conditions for there to be a crime of abuse of privileged information; secondly, to analyze two well-known cases, which took place and were decided in other jurisdictions, and attempt to understand how these cases would fall under Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code. Whereas the first case, Chiarella v. United States, was scrutinize under Article 378 of the Portuguese Securities Code, in the second, Lafonta v. AMF, the conclusion arrived at was that the crime taken place was different. This analysis allowed, on one hand, the application to a particular case of prerequisites and concepts which were explained, at a first approach, from a more theoretical perspective; on the other hand, it also allowed the further development of specific aspects of the regime, namely the difference between an insider and a tipee, as well as to more clearly set out the limits to the precise character of the information at hand.