Collateral, default penalties and infinite horizon equilibrium

Pascoa and Seghir (2009) noticed that when collateralized promises become subject to utility penalties on default, Ponzi schemes may occur. However, equilibrium exists in some interesting cases. Under low penalties, equilibrium exists if the collateral does not yield utility (for example, when it is a productive asset or a security). Equilibrium exists also under more severe penalties and collateral utility gains, when the promise or the collateral are nominal assets and the margin requirements are endogenous: relative inflation rates and margin coefficients can make the income effects dominate the penalty effects. An equilibrium refinement avoids no-trade equilibria with unduly repayment beliefs. Our refinement differs from the one used by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) as it does not eliminate no trade equilibria whose low delivery rates are consistent with the propensity to default of agents that are on the verge of selling.

Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and oligopolistic competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.

Corporate finance in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets: A survey

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Experimental Gravimetric Adsorption Equilibrium of n-Alkanes and Alkenes, Carbon Dioxide and Nitrogen in MIL-53(Al) and Zeolite 5A

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Química e Bioquímica

Upgrade of an experimental volumetric unit for gas adsorption equilibrium studies

In this work, a volumetric unit previously assembled by the research group was upgraded. This unit revamping was necessary due to the malfunction of the solenoid valves employed in the original experimental setup, which were not sealing the gas properly leading to erroneous adsorption equilibrium measurements. Therefore, the solenoid valves were substituted by manual ball valves. After the volumetric unit improvement its operation was validated. For this purpose, the adsorption equilibrium of carbon dioxide (CO2) at 323K and 0 - 20 bar was measured on two different activated carbon samples, in the of extrudates (ANG6) and of a honeycomb monolith (ACHM). The adsorption equilibrium results were compared with data previously measured by the research group, using a high-pressure microbalance from Rubotherm GmbH (Germany) – gravimetric. The results obtained using both apparatuses are coincident thus validating the good operation of the volumetric unit upgraded in this work. Furthermore, the adsorption equilibrium of CO2 at 303K and 0 - 10 bar on Metal-Organic Frameworks (MOFs) Cu-BTC and Fe-BTC was also studied. The CO2 adsorption equilibrium results for both MOFs were compared with the literature results showing good agreement, which confirms the good quality of the experimental results obtained in the new volumetric unit. Cu-BTC sample showed significantly higher CO2 adsorption capacity when compared with the Fe-BTC sample. The revamping of the volumetric unit included a new valve configuration in order to allow testing an alternative method for the measurement of adsorption equilibrium. This new method was employed to measure the adsorption equilibrium of CO2 on ANG6 and ACHM at 303, 323 and 353K within 0-10 bar. The good quality of the obtained experimental data was testified by comparison with data previously obtained by the research group in a gravimetric apparatus.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

On the labor share the long-run equilibrium and its adjustment process

This research computes an Equilibrium Labor Share using a VECM for a panel of 19 countries, analyzes what determines the speed at which the labor share adjusts towards that equilibrium and decomposes this adjustment in terms of real wages and employment. Results suggest that the speed at which a country adjusts decreases with employment protection legislation and labor taxes. Most countries’ labor shares adjustment is made through real wages changes instead of changing employment, suggesting that wage moderation policies may play an important role on the adjustment process without harming employment. Keywords: Equilibrium

On the labor share the long-run equilibrium and its adjustment process

This research computes an Equilibrium Labor Share using a VECM for a panel of 19 countries, analyzes what determines the speed at which the labor share adjusts towards that equilibrium and decomposes this adjustment in terms of real wages and employment. Results suggest that the speed at which a country adjusts decreases with employment protection legislation and labor taxes. Most countries’ labor shares adjustment is made through real wages changes instead of changing employment, suggesting that wage moderation policies may play an important role on the adjustment process without harming employment.

A conceptual model for sheet-flow drawn from rapid granular flow theories

33rd IAHR Congress: Water Engineering for a Sustainable Environment

Iberian peninsula ecosystem carbon fluxes: a model-data integration study

Dissertação apresentada para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Engenharia do Ambiente pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa,Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia

Functional studies on BolA and related genes: increasing the understanding of a protein with pleiotropic effects

Dissertation presented to obtain a Doctoral degree in Biology by Instituto de Tecnologia Química e Biológica

Mathematical modelling of shallow flows: closure models drawn from grain-scale mechanics of sediment transport and flow hydrodynamics

Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering 36(10) 1605–16

Price linkages in pharmaceutical markets

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The compliance function in banking: Perspective and future in the age of globalization

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Study on solubility of pharmaceutical compounds in ionic liquids

Dissertation to obtain the degree of master in Chemical and Biochemical Engineering