Semantic web approach for dealing with administrative boundary revisions: a case study of Dhaka City

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

The Portuguese Administrative Elite, 1851-1910

The aim of this article is to examine the composition and patterns of recruitment of the ministries’directors-general, as well as to assess the interconnections between bureaucracy and politics, from the beginnings of Regeneração (1851) until the breakdown of Monarchy (1910). The post of director-general was considered one of “political trust”, that might be filled by individuals from outside the civil service, and the selection and de-selection of officeholders depended exclusively on the ministers’ will. Nonetheless, most directors-general were experienced bureaucrats, boasting a steady career as civil servants, and remained in office for long terms, regardless of ministerial discontinuities. In other words, High Administration became relatively immune to party-driven politics. Due to their professional background and lengthy tenure, directors-general were usually highly skilled specialists, combining technical expertise and practical knowledge of the wheels of state bureaucracy. Hence, they were often influential actors in policy-making, playing an active (and sometimes decisive) part behind the scenes, in both designing and implementing government policies. As regards their social profile, directors-general formed a cohesive and homogeneous elite group: being predominantly drawn from urban middle class milieus, highly educated, and appointed to office in their forties.

Improving retail banking staff incentive systems

This Work Project seeks to analyze the viability, utility and best way of implementing mechanisms of double accounting and of insertion of low (or null) sales objectives in an incentives program. The main findings are that both processes are possible and to a certain extent advisable, although in very specific ways and with some limitations. Double accounting processes are especially effective between different segments and networks and should have a greater impact in the first evaluation periods of each case and the null objectives, albeit usable, are recommended to be always substituted by positive objectives, even if quite small. Moreover, it is concluded that the formal structure of the incentives program influences significantly these concepts, namely concerning the duration of the evaluation periods and the interaction of the objectives of different entities for both the vertical (hierarchic) and horizontal (individual and collective) levels.