Improving Millennium Bank's personal finance manager

Double Degree

How bank business models relate with risk?: The case of Portugal in times of financial crisis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Managing marginal capital requirements in solvency II: Analysis of a real insurance portfolio

This thesis provides a complete analysis of the Standard Capital Requirements given by Solvency II for a real insurance portfolio. We analyze the investment portfolio of BPI Vida e Pensões, an insurance company affiliated with a Portuguese bank BPI, both at security, sub-portfolio and asset class levels. By using the Standard Formula from EIOPA, Total SCR amounts to 239M€. This value is mostly explained by Market and Default Risk whereas the former is driven by Spread and Concentration Risks. Following the methodology of Leblanc (2011), we examine the Marginal Contribution of an asset to the SCR which allows for the evaluation of the risks of each security given its characteristics and interactions in the portfolio. The top contributors to the SCR are Corporate Bonds and Term Deposits. By exploring further the composition of the portfolio, our results show that slight changes in allocation of Term and Cash Deposits have severe impacts on the total Concentration and Default Risks, respectively. Also, diversification effects are very relevant by representing savings of 122M€. Finally, Solvency II represents an opportunity for the portfolio optimization. By constructing efficient frontiers, we find that as the target expected return increases, a shift from Term Deposits/ Commercial Papers to Eurozone/Peripheral and finally Equities occurs.

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.