Positive self-image in tournaments

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.

Corporate performance and the pay gap

Increasing disparity between executive compensation and that of the average worker (the pay gap) has generated a fierce debate about its causes and effects. This paper studies the determinants and performance effects of the pay gap through the prism of Tournament Incentives and the Equity Fairness Theory. Results show that the size of the pay gap is caused primarily by the size of the firm and by the standards of its industry and also by the unionization rate and whether the Chairman is also the CEO. The paper Concludes by showins that the pay gap has a positive effect on firm performance in the United States Keywords: