The MPs of the First Portuguese Republic: A prosopographic study

This paper summarises the results of the first systematic, detailed prosopographic study of the MPs – the deputados of the Lower Chamber - of the First Portuguese Republic (1910-1926). Data are presented both by legislature and for the overall period. Two kinds of background variables are explored: sociodemographic (birthplace, age, education and profession) and political (previous experience in other elite positions). Regime change in 1910 resulted in the replacement of the former political elite by homines novi. Most MPs of the Republican regime were born in small towns and communities, had carried out higher educational studies (with prevalence for law training), were mainly drawn from the professions (practising lawyers and doctors) and the Army, and were elected for the first-time at relatively young ages. Parliamentary turnover was high (two-thirds of the representatives held just one mandate) and a large proportion of MPs had a consistent connection (birth, family ties, occupation) to the constituencies to which they had been elected.

Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.