Characterization and regulation of a bacterial sugar phosphatase of the haloalkanoate dehalogenase superfamily, AraL, from Bacillus subtilis

FEBS journal, Volume 278, Issue 14, pages 2511-2524, July 2011

Bioactive beads for local sensing of proteases in 3D engineered tissues

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Bioengenharia (MIT)

Characterization and regulation of a bacterial sugar phosphatase of the HAD superfamily, AraL, from Bacillus subtilis.

AraL from Bacillus subtilis is a member of the ubiquitous haloalkanoate dehalogenase, HAD, superfamily. The araL gene has been cloned, over-expressed in Escherichia coli and its product purified to homogeneity. The enzyme displays phosphatase activity, which is optimal at neutral pH (7.0) and 65 °C. Substrate screening and kinetic analysis showed AraL to have low specificity and catalytic activity towards several sugar phosphates, which are metabolic intermediates of the glycolytic and pentose phosphate pathways. Based on substrate specificity and gene context within the arabinose metabolic operon, a putative physiological role of AraL in detoxification of accidental accumulation of phosphorylated metabolites has been proposed. The ability of AraL to catabolise several related secondary metabolites requires regulation at the genetic level. Here, by site- directed mutagenesis, we show that AraL production is regulated by a structure in the translation initiation region of the mRNA, which most probably blocks access to the ribosome-binding site, preventing protein synthesis. Members of HAD subfamily IIA and IIB are characterised by a broad-range and overlapping specificity that anticipated the need for regulation at the genetic level. In this study we provide evidence for the existence of a genetic regulatory mechanism controlling AraL production.

Social network analysis applied to knowledge creation and transfer in the portuguese agricultural R&D field: an exploratory study

Paper presented at the 9th European Conference on Knowledge Management, Southampton Solent University, Southampton, UK, 4-5 Sep. 2008. URL: http://academic-conferences.org/eckm/eckm2008/eckm08-home.htm

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.