Corporate finance in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets: A survey

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The simple economics of risk-sharing agreements between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry

The Janssen-Cilag proposal for a risk-sharing agreement regarding bortezomib received a welcome signal from NICE. The Office of Fair Trading report included risk-sharing agreements as an available tool for the National Health Service. Nonetheless, recent discussions have somewhat neglected the economic fundamentals underlying risk-sharing agreements. We argue here that risk-sharing agreements, although attractive due to the principle of paying by results, also entail risks. Too many patients may be put under treatment even with a low success probability. Prices are likely to be adjusted upward, in anticipation of future risk-sharing agreements between the pharmaceutical company and the third-party payer. An available instrument is a verification cost per patient treated, which allows obtaining the first-best allocation of patients to the new treatment, under the risk sharing agreement. Overall, the welfare effects of risk-sharing agreements are ambiguous, and care must be taken with their use.

The compliance function in banking: Perspective and future in the age of globalization

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Three essays on economics of predictability of stock returns

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Essays in environmental and happiness economics

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Four essays in behavioral economics

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Inefficient commuting in a city with spillovers

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Liquidity, business cycles and monetary policy: A simulation

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Higher education branding: Nova School of Business and Economics and Bocconi University

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Upgrade of an experimental volumetric unit for gas adsorption equilibrium studies

In this work, a volumetric unit previously assembled by the research group was upgraded. This unit revamping was necessary due to the malfunction of the solenoid valves employed in the original experimental setup, which were not sealing the gas properly leading to erroneous adsorption equilibrium measurements. Therefore, the solenoid valves were substituted by manual ball valves. After the volumetric unit improvement its operation was validated. For this purpose, the adsorption equilibrium of carbon dioxide (CO2) at 323K and 0 - 20 bar was measured on two different activated carbon samples, in the of extrudates (ANG6) and of a honeycomb monolith (ACHM). The adsorption equilibrium results were compared with data previously measured by the research group, using a high-pressure microbalance from Rubotherm GmbH (Germany) – gravimetric. The results obtained using both apparatuses are coincident thus validating the good operation of the volumetric unit upgraded in this work. Furthermore, the adsorption equilibrium of CO2 at 303K and 0 - 10 bar on Metal-Organic Frameworks (MOFs) Cu-BTC and Fe-BTC was also studied. The CO2 adsorption equilibrium results for both MOFs were compared with the literature results showing good agreement, which confirms the good quality of the experimental results obtained in the new volumetric unit. Cu-BTC sample showed significantly higher CO2 adsorption capacity when compared with the Fe-BTC sample. The revamping of the volumetric unit included a new valve configuration in order to allow testing an alternative method for the measurement of adsorption equilibrium. This new method was employed to measure the adsorption equilibrium of CO2 on ANG6 and ACHM at 303, 323 and 353K within 0-10 bar. The good quality of the obtained experimental data was testified by comparison with data previously obtained by the research group in a gravimetric apparatus.

The economics of Vieira da Silva

This paper investigates the time valuation and the age valuation profile of art-works created by the Portuguese female painter Maria Helena Vieira da Silva. It uses data from records from her paintings auction sales between 1986 and 2014, taken from Artprice.com. The study explores three aspects regarding her artistic career: (1) estimation of Age-valuation profile, defining her creativity pattern and the age at which she produced her most valuable paintings; (2) estimation of time valuation profile, through a creation of an individual hedonic price index for Vieira da Silva; (3) internationalization phenomenon of the artist, investigating whether selling prices are primarily set in euros or in US dollar. The results suggest that Vieira da Silva peaked quite early in her career; her paintings prices are not very sensible to economic cycles and tends to slightly increase afterlife; the empirical results are not suggestive on which currency is the best predictor of her paintings’ price.

Essays in health economics: Volume-Outcome Effect, upcoding behaviour and the evaluation of a short-term intervention program

Evidence in the literature suggests a negative relationship between volume of medical procedures and mortality rates in the health care sector. In general, high-volume hospitals appear to achieve lower mortality rates, although considerable variation exists. However, most studies focus on US hospitals, which face different incentives than hospitals in a National Health Service (NHS). In order to add to the literature, this study aims to understand what happens in a NHS. Results reveal a statistically significant correlation between volume of procedures and better outcomes for the following medical procedures: cerebral infarction, respiratory infections, circulatory disorders with AMI, bowel procedures, cirrhosis, and hip and femur procedures. The effect is explained with the practice-makes-perfect hypothesis through static effects of scale with little evidence of learning-by-doing. The centralization of those medical procedures is recommended given that this policy would save a considerable number of lives (reduction of 12% in deaths for cerebral infarction).

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).