R&D spillovers in an endogenous growth model with physical capital, human capital and varieties

There is a family of models with Physical, Human capital and R&D for which convergence properties have been discussed (Arnold, 2000a; Gómez, 2005). However, spillovers in R&D have been ignored in this context. We introduce spillovers in this model and derive its steady-state and stability properties. This new feature implies that the model is characterized by a system of four differential equations. A unique Balanced Growth Path along with a two dimensional stable manifold are obtained under simple and reasonable conditions. Transition is oscillatory toward the steady-state for plausible values of parameters.

Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.

Making sense of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing in duopoly markets

The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner’s (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous timing games.

Absorption in human capital and r&d effects in an endogenous growth model

Until now, in models of endogenous growth with physical capital, human capital and R&D such as in Arnold [Journal of Macroeconomics 20 (1998)] and followers, steady-state growth is independent of innovation activities. We introduce absorption in human capital accumulation and describe the steady-state and transition of the model. We show that this new feature provides an effect of R&D in growth, consumption and welfare. We compare the quantitative effects of R&D productivity with the quantitative effects of Human Capital productivity in wealth and welfare.

Transitional dynamics of an endogenous growth model with an erosion effect

The convergence features of an Endogenous Growth model with Physical capital, Human Capital and R&D have been studied. We add an erosion effect (supported by empirical evidence) to this model, and fully characterize its convergence properties. The dynamics is described by a fourth-order system of differential equations. We show that the model converges along a one-dimensional stable manifold and that its equilibrium is saddle-path stable. We also argue that one of the implications of considering this “erosion effect” is the increase in the adherence of the model to data.