4 resultados para Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models
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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.
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RESUMO: Introdução As normas de orientação clínica são ferramentas úteis na translação de conhecimentos desde a investigação para a prática clínica diária. Estratégias ativas de implementação de normas de orientação clínica requerem elevado esforço organizacional e financeiro. Quando os recursos são escassos, as estratégias passivas podem ser a única opção de disseminação. Desde 2011 a Direção Geral da Saúde publicou cento e cinquenta e nove normas de orientação clínica. Nesta Tese é feita uma avaliação do impacto que estratégias de disseminação de normas de orientação clínica têm no padrão de prescrição dos médicos e uma avaliação qualitativa do processo das normas de orientação clínica em Portugal. Métodos: O primeiro artigo é um estudo quasi experimental usando uma série de análises temporais interrompida para comparar os níveis observados e esperados de prescrição de inibidores da ciclooxigenasa-2, antes e depois da publicação da norma de orientação clínica sobre a utilização de anti-inflamatórios não esteroides. O segundo estudo é um artigo de opinião e debate no qual numa primeira parte contextualiza o processo das normas da Direcção Geral da Saúde, na segunda parte aponta virtudes e defeitos no processo e a terceira parte constitui uma contribuição com vista à melhoria do processo. Discussão A produção de normas de orientação clínica requer metodologia rigorosa e complexa. A literatura médica revela que a translação de conhecimento é uma tarefa árdua. Estratégias de implementação ativas requerem recursos financeiros e organizacionais sólidos. Estratégias de implementação passivas podem representar uma solução aceitável se os recursos financeiros e organizacionais escasseiam. Pouco é conhecido sobre a eficácia destas estratégias fora do contexto de investigação. Com esta Tese pretendo contribuir para a clarificação desta resposta, outros países e instituições podem ver utilidade nesta informação, bem como pretendo contribuir para a discussão e melhoria do processo das normas de orientação clínica em Portugal. ------------------ ABSTRACT: Introduction Clinical practice guidelines can help address the failure to translate research findings into clinical practice. Active clinical practice guidelines implementation strategies require active efforts from organizations and are resource and financially demanding. Passive implementation strategies may represent the only option if resources are scarce. Out of research environment, real world efficacy of passive implementation strategies is still undetermined. Since 2011 the Portuguese General Health Directorate published one hundred and fifty nine guidelines. In this Thesis I evaluate the impact of passive dissemination of clinical practice guideline in clinician’s prescription behavior and review, from a qualitative point of view, the Portuguese clinical practice guideline process. Methods The first study is a quasi-experimental study using a retrospective interrupted time-series analysis design to compare the observed and expected prescription of cyclooxygenase-2 before and after the non steroidal antiinflammatory guideline publication. The second study is an opinion and debate article in which I firstly review the General Health Directorate guideline process. The second part states positive and negative aspects in the process and the third part is a contribution aimed at improving the process in the future. Discussion Clinical practice guidelines production demands a rigorous and complex methodology. medical iterature reveals that knowledge translation is a difficult task. Active implementation strategies demand solid financial and organizational resources. Passive implementation strategies may represent an acceptable solution if financial and organizational resources are scarce. Little is known about the efficacy of these strategies out of the research context. With this Thesis I intend to contribute to clarify this question, other countries and institutions with similar conditions may find this information useful, and also to contribute for the discussion and general improvement of national clinical practice guidelines process.
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Dissertação apresentada para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores – Sistemas Digitais e Percepcionais pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia
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Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).