O dever de obediência a ordens ilegais na Guarda Nacional Republicana

The Republican National Guard (GNR) is a military structure and hierarchical force where discipline and obedience is a serious matter, but at the same time, the scope of its activity relates to the protection of the rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens and the primacy of public interest. While security force, GNR ensures democratic law, guarantee the internal security and the rights of citizens. The controversial issue that lies at the heart of this work its related with the balance between the hierarchy and the written law. The hierarchy, also established by law, with given powers, exist to apply the law. However, the rule of law has exceptions. Which institute to prioritize, hierarchy or the law. And within the law, its rules or the exceptions. Who decides? The GNR's officers have to obey the laws and regulations and comply with the accuracy and timeliness determinations, orders and instructions issued by a superior, given in terms of service, as long as does not involve the practice of crime. The GNR´s officer with command tasks exercises power of authority inherent in these functions, and the corresponding disciplinary authority, being responsible for acts by himself or by his order are practiced. Identify situations of exception to law enforcement, the situations in which one must obey illegal orders, is difficult and thankless, it requires conferred authority and raises the weight of responsibility for decisions and orders issued.

Cumprimento de ordens, obediência hierárquica e disciplina militar versus perpetração (in)voluntária de crimes

Following orders, hierarchical obedience and military discipline are essential values for the survival of the armed forces. Without them, it is not possible to conceive the armed forces as an essential pillar of a democratic state of law and a guarantor of national independence. As issuing orders as well as receiving and following them are inextricably linked to military discipline, and as such injunctions entail the workings of a particular obedience regime within the specific kind of organized power framework which is the Armed Forces, only by analysing the importance of such orders within this microcosm – with its strict hierarchical structure – will it be possible to understand which criminal judicial qualification to ascribe to the individual at the rear by reference to the role of the front line individual (i.e. the one who issues an order vs the one who executes it). That is, of course, when we are faced with the practice of unlawful acts, keeping in mind the organizational framework and its influence over the will of the executor. One thing we take as read, if the orders can be described as unlawful, the boundary line of the duty of obedience, which cannot be overstepped, both because of a legal as well as a constitutional imperative, will have been crossed. And the military have sworn an oath of obedience to the fundamental law. The topic of hierarchical obedience cannot be separated from the analysis of current legislation which pertains to the topic within military institutions. With that in mind, it appeared relevant to address the major norms which regulate the matter within the Portuguese military legal system, and, whenever necessary and required by the reality under analysis, to relate that to civilian law or legal doctrine.

Knowledge Society and Geography: A Theoretical Approach

The transition process between information and knowledge is faster and so the inputs that influence social and political practises. The dissemination of information is now determinant in terms of territorial competitiveness and both public and private sector take large benefits when the data-information- knowledge value chain repeats itself trough space and time. Mankind depends nowadays on the creation and diffusion of good and reliable information. Speed is also important and the greater the speed, the faster the opportunities for global markets. Information must be an input for knowledge and obviously for decision. So, the power of information is unquestionable. This paper focuses on concepts like information, knowledge and other, more geographical and tries to explain how territories change from real to virtual. Knowledge society appears on an evolutional context in which information dissemination is wider and technological potential overwrites traditional notions of Geography. To understand the mutations over the territories, the causes and the consequences emerges the Geography of the Knowledge Society, a new discipline inside Geography with a special concern about modern society and socio-economical developing models.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Process virtualization theory (PVT) and institutional theory (INT) to explain SAAS adoption

Software as a service (SaaS) is a service model in which the applications are accessible from various client devices through internet. Several studies report possible factors driving the adoption of SaaS but none have considered the perception of the SaaS features and the pressures existing in the organization’s environment. We propose an integrated research model that combines the process virtualization theory (PVT) and the institutional theory (INT). PVT seeks to explain whether SaaS processes are suitable for migration into virtual environments via an information technology-based mechanism. INT seeks to explain the effects of the institutionalized environment on the structure and actions of the organization. The research makes three contributions. First, it addresses a gap in the SaaS adoption literature by studying the internal perception of the technical features of SaaS and external coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures faced by an organization. Second, it empirically tests many of the propositions of PVT and INT in the SaaS context, thereby helping to determine how the theory operates in practice. Third, the integration of PVT and INT contributes to the information system (IS) discipline, deepening the applicability and strengths of these theories.