Professions and inter-disciplinary teamwork in socially embedded bureaucracies: Synthesis and hypotheses on the impact of informal and formal organization

In order to maximize their productivity, inter-disciplinary multi-occupation teams of professionals need to maximize inter-occupational cooperation in team decision making. Cooperation, however, is challenged by status anxiety over organizational careers and identity politics among team members who differ by ethnicity-race, gender, religion, nativity, citizenship status, etc. The purpose of this paper is to develop hypotheses about how informal and formal features of bureaucracy influence the level of inter-occupation cooperation achieved by socially diverse, multi-occupation work teams of professionals in bureaucratic work organizations. The 18 hypotheses, which are developed with the heuristic empirical case of National Science Foundation-sponsored university school partnerships in math and science curriculum innovation in the United States, culminate in the argument that cooperation can be realized as a synthesis of tensions between informal and formal features of bureaucracy in the form of participatory, high performance work systems.

The revolution of lusophone musics in the city of Lisbon

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências Musiciais. Variante de Etnomusicologia

Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

Building a knowledge and learning society in Portugal - Adult students in technological schools and higher education institutions

Chapter in Merrill, Barbara (ed.) (2009) Learning to Change? The Role of Identity and Learning Careers in Adult Education. Hamburg: Peter Lang Publishers. URL: http://www.peterlang.com/ index.cfm?vID=58279&vLang=E&vHR=1&vUR=2&vUUR=1

The International Multilateral System: Imperatives of Change, Potential Scenarios and Suggestions for the Future

Thesis presented to satisfy the necessary requirements for obtaining a PhD degree in International Relation with specialization in Globalization and the Environment,

Unemployment, technological revolution and competition from developing countries

Unemployment is probably the most important social problem of our times in the rich industrial world. There are 35 million people unemployed in OECD countries(about 8,5%): the situation however differs between the USA and Europe. In this paper we will discuss the reasons for suche a difference.

Politics, Commerce, and Colonization in Angola at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em História Moderna e dos Descobrimentos

Competition policy costs to firms

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Economic rents, institutions and growth: International aid and natural resources: A comparative analysis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Empirical analysis of the lending decisions of Chinese formal financial institutions in rural areas

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Institutions and firm formation: An empirical analysis of Portuguese municipalities

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The impact of banks dimension on profitability, sustainability and efficiency: An analysis for the Iberian financial system

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Migrant networks and political participation in Mozambique

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

This paper aims at analyzing the effects of lobbying over economic growth and primarily welfare. We model explicitly the interaction between policy-makers and firms in a setup where the latter undertakes political contributions to the former in exchange for more restrictive market regulations which induce exit and enhance the profitability of the market. In a sectorial equilibrium, despite stimulating growth, lobbying restricts the market structure and reduces welfare when compared to the free-entry outcome. However, once general equilibrium considerations are taken into account, we find that lobbying may improve welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium, by means of an expansion in aggregate demand. This introduces a new paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic performance.