The Portuguese Administrative Elite, 1851-1910

The aim of this article is to examine the composition and patterns of recruitment of the ministries’directors-general, as well as to assess the interconnections between bureaucracy and politics, from the beginnings of Regeneração (1851) until the breakdown of Monarchy (1910). The post of director-general was considered one of “political trust”, that might be filled by individuals from outside the civil service, and the selection and de-selection of officeholders depended exclusively on the ministers’ will. Nonetheless, most directors-general were experienced bureaucrats, boasting a steady career as civil servants, and remained in office for long terms, regardless of ministerial discontinuities. In other words, High Administration became relatively immune to party-driven politics. Due to their professional background and lengthy tenure, directors-general were usually highly skilled specialists, combining technical expertise and practical knowledge of the wheels of state bureaucracy. Hence, they were often influential actors in policy-making, playing an active (and sometimes decisive) part behind the scenes, in both designing and implementing government policies. As regards their social profile, directors-general formed a cohesive and homogeneous elite group: being predominantly drawn from urban middle class milieus, highly educated, and appointed to office in their forties.

Decentralization and privatization in Portuguese health reforms

ABSTRACT - The Portuguese National Health Service (SNS), a universal, centralized and public owned health care system, exhibits an extraordinary record of equalization in the access to health care and health gains in the late thirty years. However, the most recent history of the Portuguese health reform is pervaded by the influence of decentralization and privatization. Decentralization has been present in the system design since the 1976 Constitution, at least in theory. Private ownership of health care suppliers and out-ofpocket expenditures, on the financing side, both have a long tradition of relevance in the NHS mix of services. The initial aim of this study was to demonstrate expected parallelism between health reforms and public administration reforms, where a common pattern of joint decentralization and privatization was observed in many countries. Observers would be tempted to consider these two movements as common signs of new public management (NPM) developments. They have common objectives, are established around the core concepts of gains in effectiveness, efficiency, equity and quality of public services, through improved accountability. However, in practice, in Portugal, each movement was developed in a totally separated way. Besides those rooted in the NPM theory, there are few visible signs of association between decentralization and privatization. Decentralization, in the Portuguese SNS, was never intended to be followed by a privatization movement; it was seen merely as a public administration tool. Private management of health services, as stated in the most recent SNS legislation, was never intended to have decentralization as a condition or as a consequence. Paradoxically, in the Portuguese context, it has led invariably to centralized control. While presented as separate instruments for a common purpose, the association between decentralization and privatization still lacks a convincing demonstration. Many common health care management stereotypes remain to be checked out if we want to look for eventual associations between these two organizational tools.