Corruption: Who pays for the bill?

This paper intends to study who pays for corruption in Brazil from 2005 to 2011. Politicians may decide to charge the spillovers of corruption at a municipal level through taxes or to charge it to the entire country through voluntary transfers. The used measure of corruption is based on audit reports conducted on randomly selected municipalities from 2005 to 2011.In order to address this question an IV strategy was computed using as instrument for the number of observed cases of corruption the dummy variable of being audited or not. We evaluated the impact of corruption on taxes and on voluntary transfers and concluded that with an increase in the number of observed cases of corruption the first decreases and the latest registers an increase. Therefore, considering all Brazilian municipalities, mayors prefer to spread the bill all over the country than charging it locally.

Empirical evidences on voluntary delisting phenomenon

The paper studies what drives firms to voluntary delist from capital markets and what differs in firms’ behavior and fundamentals between public-to-private transactions and M&A deals with listed corporations. Moreover, I study the relationship between ownership percentage in controlling shareholders’ hands and cumulative returns around the delisting public announcement. I perform my tests both for the Italian and the US markets and I compare the findings to better understand how the phenomenon works in these different institutional environments. Consistent with my expectations, I find that the likelihood of delisting is mainly related to size, underperformance and undervaluation, while shareholders are more rewarded when their companies are involved in PTP transactions than in M&As with public firms.