The emergence of product certification systems as trade barriers

This paper addresses the growing difficulties automobile manufacturers face within their after sales business: an increasing number of trade obstacles set up by import countries discriminates against the foreign suppliers and impedes the international sales of genuine parts. The purpose of the study is to explore the emergence of trade restrictive product certification systems, which affect spare parts exports of automobile manufacturers. The methodology used includes review of the literature and an empirical study based on qualitative interviews with representatives of major stakeholders of the automotive after sales business. Relevant key drivers, which initiate the introduction of technical regulations in importing countries, are identified and analysed to evaluate their effect on the emerging trade policy. The analysis of the key drivers outlines that several interacting components, such as the global competitiveness of the country, macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, and certain country-specific variables induce trade restrictive product certification systems. The findings allow for an early detection of the emergence of product certification systems and provide a means to early recognise the risks and opportunities for the sales of automotive spare parts in the automakers’ target markets. This allows the manufacturers to react immediately and adapt in time to the upcoming changes.

Electoral opportunism and fiscal policy before and after the EMU

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Macroeconomic impacts of politics and policy: Applications to financial and real markets

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Competition policy costs to firms

The existence of competition policy forces companies to adjust their behaviour. This is also costly. Using a database from a company on contracts, I will try to estimate if a specific competition policy disposition, supply contracts cannot be longer than 60 months, has costs for the coffee suppliers operating in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market. The estimation method used in this paper will be OLS. The results suggest that limiting the duration of exclusivity contracts to 60 months can be harmful to the coffee suppliers and it can even seriously affect the market functioning. Key