Functional and molecular characterization of SR45, a plant-specific factor involved in sugar and stress signaling in Arabidopsis thaliana

Dissertation presented to obtain the Ph.D degree in Molecular Biology

Benefits & drawbacks of different means of interaction for placing objects above a video footage

Public Display Systems (PDS) increasingly have a greater presence in our cities. These systems provide information and advertising specifically tailored to audiences in spaces such as airports, train stations, and shopping centers. A large number of public displays are also being deployed for entertainment reasons. Sometimes designing and prototyping PDS come to be a laborious, complex and a costly task. This dissertation focuses on the design and evaluation of PDS at early development phases with the aim of facilitating low-effort, rapid design and the evaluation of interactive PDS. This study focuses on the IPED Toolkit. This tool proposes the design, prototype, and evaluation of public display systems, replicating real-world scenes in the lab. This research aims at identifying benefits and drawbacks on the use of different means to place overlays/virtual displays above a panoramic video footage, recorded at real-world locations. The means of interaction studied in this work are on the one hand the keyboard and mouse, and on the other hand the tablet with two different techniques of use. To carry out this study, an android application has been developed whose function is to allow users to interact with the IPED Toolkit using the tablet. Additionally, the toolkit has been modified and adapted to tablets by using different web technologies. Finally the users study makes a comparison about the different means of interaction.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

How small accounting firms can compete in an environment in which the big four are getting bigger

This paper sets out to determine how small accounting firms can compete in the United States in the early 21st century. The first chapter identifies the central goal of the paper: namely, to use existing literature and market data to define a business strategy for Ross & Moncure, Inc., a small accounting firm in the metropolitan Washington area. The second chapter is a literature review, and in it the author finds that large accounting firms are advantaged in terms of reputation, ability to diversify, and ability to retain employees, but are disadvantaged in their ability to form longstanding successful relationships with clients. In the third chapter, the author explores the relationship between the Big Four firms and their employees. The goal of this chapter is to determine how small accounting firms can compete for top talent in the HR market, and the author finds that this can be done by offering faster career progression and more client interaction. The fourth chapter looks at the market for accounting services in the United States, exploring the different options that consumers have to meet their accounting needs. It is found in this chapter that big and small accounting firms tend to compete for clients of different profiles. In the fifth chapter, the author uses proprietary company data to explore the composition, existing strategy and culture of Ross & Moncure. In the sixth chapter, all of the previous chapters come together to formulate a strategy and plan for action for Ross & Moncure: specifically, that the firm should further cultivate networks and relationships, and should create a fulfilling professional environment by increasing client-employee interaction, encouraging external education, and allowing employees to take on many different projects