Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Empirical evidences on voluntary delisting phenomenon

The paper studies what drives firms to voluntary delist from capital markets and what differs in firms’ behavior and fundamentals between public-to-private transactions and M&A deals with listed corporations. Moreover, I study the relationship between ownership percentage in controlling shareholders’ hands and cumulative returns around the delisting public announcement. I perform my tests both for the Italian and the US markets and I compare the findings to better understand how the phenomenon works in these different institutional environments. Consistent with my expectations, I find that the likelihood of delisting is mainly related to size, underperformance and undervaluation, while shareholders are more rewarded when their companies are involved in PTP transactions than in M&As with public firms.

Process virtualization theory (PVT) and institutional theory (INT) to explain SAAS adoption

Software as a service (SaaS) is a service model in which the applications are accessible from various client devices through internet. Several studies report possible factors driving the adoption of SaaS but none have considered the perception of the SaaS features and the pressures existing in the organization’s environment. We propose an integrated research model that combines the process virtualization theory (PVT) and the institutional theory (INT). PVT seeks to explain whether SaaS processes are suitable for migration into virtual environments via an information technology-based mechanism. INT seeks to explain the effects of the institutionalized environment on the structure and actions of the organization. The research makes three contributions. First, it addresses a gap in the SaaS adoption literature by studying the internal perception of the technical features of SaaS and external coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures faced by an organization. Second, it empirically tests many of the propositions of PVT and INT in the SaaS context, thereby helping to determine how the theory operates in practice. Third, the integration of PVT and INT contributes to the information system (IS) discipline, deepening the applicability and strengths of these theories.