The effect of ownership concentration on management behavior in Belgian banks: A case study

Double Degree. A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s Degree in Finance from NOVA – School of Business and Economics and a Masters Degree in Management from Louvain School of Management

Empirical evidences on voluntary delisting phenomenon

The paper studies what drives firms to voluntary delist from capital markets and what differs in firms’ behavior and fundamentals between public-to-private transactions and M&A deals with listed corporations. Moreover, I study the relationship between ownership percentage in controlling shareholders’ hands and cumulative returns around the delisting public announcement. I perform my tests both for the Italian and the US markets and I compare the findings to better understand how the phenomenon works in these different institutional environments. Consistent with my expectations, I find that the likelihood of delisting is mainly related to size, underperformance and undervaluation, while shareholders are more rewarded when their companies are involved in PTP transactions than in M&As with public firms.

Process virtualization theory (PVT) and institutional theory (INT) to explain SAAS adoption

Software as a service (SaaS) is a service model in which the applications are accessible from various client devices through internet. Several studies report possible factors driving the adoption of SaaS but none have considered the perception of the SaaS features and the pressures existing in the organization’s environment. We propose an integrated research model that combines the process virtualization theory (PVT) and the institutional theory (INT). PVT seeks to explain whether SaaS processes are suitable for migration into virtual environments via an information technology-based mechanism. INT seeks to explain the effects of the institutionalized environment on the structure and actions of the organization. The research makes three contributions. First, it addresses a gap in the SaaS adoption literature by studying the internal perception of the technical features of SaaS and external coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures faced by an organization. Second, it empirically tests many of the propositions of PVT and INT in the SaaS context, thereby helping to determine how the theory operates in practice. Third, the integration of PVT and INT contributes to the information system (IS) discipline, deepening the applicability and strengths of these theories.

Does ownership structure matter? Three essays in finance

Management

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Hospital-empresa : crónica de um nascimento retardado : Políticas de saúde : Em foco

RESUMO - A gestão empresarial dos hospitais é uma velha aspiração do sistema e dos profissionais da saúde em Portugal. Já o Estatuto Hospitalar de 1968 previa a organização e a gestão dos hospitais «em termos de gestão empresarial». A Lei de Bases da Saúde, de 1990, relembrava que a administração das unidades de saúde deveria obedecer a «regras de gestão empresarial». O Hospital Fernando da Fonseca, criado desde 1991, foi objecto de concessão de gestão por contrato, precedendo concurso público, a uma entidade privada, em 1995. Em 1997, o relatório do Grupo de Trabalho sobre o Estatuto Jurídico do Hospital recomendava a adopção da figura de instituto público com natureza empresarial, adequada autonomia de gestão e forte responsabilidade, podendo regular-se, em alguns domínios, por normas de direito privado. Em 1998 foi criado o Hospital de São Sebastião, em Santa Maria da Feira, com formas inovadoras de gestão, utilizando meios de gestão maleáveis. Em 1999 foi criada a Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, englobando não apenas o Hospital de Pedro Hispano, naquela cidade, mas também os quatro centros de saúde da sua área de atracção. Em 2001 foi criado o Hospital do Barlavento Algarvio, em moldes semelhantes aos do Hospital de São Sebastião. Os restantes hospitais públicos mantiveram a estrutura e regras de funcionamento convencionais. Observa-se que o modelo de gestão convencional do hospital público tem hoje consequências desfavoráveis para os cidadãos, para os profissionais que nele trabalham e também para o sistema de saúde no seu conjunto. Em 2002, uma nova lei alterou disposições da Lei de Bases da Saúde de 1990 e aprovou um novo regime jurídico de gestão hospitalar. De acordo com ele, a rede de prestação de cuidados de saúde passou a integrar vários modelos de hospitais: hospitais SPA, hospitais EPE, hospitais SA, clínicas privadas com ou sem nome de hospital, instituições e serviços geridos por entidades públicas ou privadas, mediante contrato de gestão e hospitais PPP. Analisam-se os ganhos introduzidos pelo modelo inovador de hospital SA, no que respeita ao estatuto, dotação de capital, poderes especiais, regras de controlo financeiro, regimes laborais, órgãos sociais, instrumentos de gestão e direcção técnica. Finalmente, antecipa-se um quadro analítico de oportunidades e riscos sobre este modelo. As críticas têm-se concentrado sobre a estratégia de mudança e sobre o mecanismo de escolha dos dirigentes e das respectivas chefias intermédias. Em relação à estratégia, conclui-se ser a questão mais empírica do que conceptual. Em relação à forma de identificação dos dirigentes, recomenda-se o acompanhamento crítico da experiência, salientando-se, a par do que ela pode trazer de positivo, os riscos de partidarização e instabilidade.

Garland, since 1776- a unique ownership structure

The case is based on Garland, a 240 years old Portuguese family business, now owned by the Dawson family. It focuses on a decision made 50 years ago, aligned with what had been the company’s history, about the ownership rules for family members, which influences the ownership structure of the firm. It addresses the main issues about ownership in family businesses, and tackles the problem of succession planning and fair process. It contains a teaching note to support the utilization of the case in a classroom context, with learning objectives, target audience, a teaching plan, questions and proposed answers, and theory that relates to the case. It is also complemented with an epilogue and an overview of the case.