Computational design with flexible backbone sampling for protein remodeling and scaffolding of complex binding sites

Dissertation presented to obtain the Doutoramento (Ph.D.) degree in Biochemistry at the Instituto de Tecnologia Qu mica e Biol ogica da Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Corruption: Who pays for the bill?

This paper intends to study who pays for corruption in Brazil from 2005 to 2011. Politicians may decide to charge the spillovers of corruption at a municipal level through taxes or to charge it to the entire country through voluntary transfers. The used measure of corruption is based on audit reports conducted on randomly selected municipalities from 2005 to 2011.In order to address this question an IV strategy was computed using as instrument for the number of observed cases of corruption the dummy variable of being audited or not. We evaluated the impact of corruption on taxes and on voluntary transfers and concluded that with an increase in the number of observed cases of corruption the first decreases and the latest registers an increase. Therefore, considering all Brazilian municipalities, mayors prefer to spread the bill all over the country than charging it locally.

Evaluation of the welfare impact of regulating mobile termination rates in Portugal

Following the European Commission’s 2009 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, the Portuguese regulatory authority (ANACOM) decided to reduce termination prices in mobile networks to their long-run incremental cost (LRIC). Nevertheless, no serious quantitative assessment of the potential effects of this decision was carried out. In this paper, we adapt and calibrate the Harbord and Hoernig (2014) model of the UK mobile telephony market to the Portuguese reality, and simulate the likely impact on consumer surplus, profits and welfare of four different regulatory approaches: pure LRIC, reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks, “bill & keep”, and asymmetric termination rates. Our results show that reducing MTRs does increase social welfare, profits and consumer surplus in the fixed market, but mobile subscribers are seriously harmed by this decision.