Aspects of Passives in Capeverdean (Santiago’s variety)

The present dissertation intends to study passives in Capeverdean. I argue that Capeverdean have eventive passives with specific morphology, postverbal morphemes, -du and -da, which affix to the verb to form passives and interact with the TMA morphemes available in the language in the same way as in the active voice. I also show that Capeverdean only allows short passives. However, this study demonstrates that the by-phrase, although not expressed phonologically, is implicit and can be tracked through instrumentals and Agent-oriented adverbs. In order to account for this specific property of Capeverdean passives, I assume the existence of a Voice head which introduces the external argument in all finite sentences in Capeverdean, except in unaccusatives, following proposals from Marantz (1984), Kratzer (1996), Sailor & Ahn (2010), Pratas (2014). I also assume that this Voice head is subject to a Doubly Filled Comp Filter, similar to what is proposed in Koopman (1997), which determines that either heads or specifiers can be overt, never both. In the case of passives, I propose that external argument is in Spec,Voice and the passive morphology is lexicalized in Voice0 and that while Spec,Voice is silent, Voice0 is not. This configuration can be explained if it is assumed, following Costa & Martins (2004), that in Capeverdean passives Voice0 is a strong functional head, thus requiring visibility at PF. This restriction, combined with the Doubly Filled Comp filter, imposes that Spec,Voice is silent.

Proactive services ecosystem framework

Dissertation presented to obtain the degree of Doctor in Electrical and Computer Engineering, specialization on Collaborative Enterprise Networks

Evolution of reputation in networks: A mean field game approach

This work models the competitive behaviour of individuals who maximize their own utility managing their network of connections with other individuals. Utility is taken as a synonym of reputation in this model. Each agent has to decide between two variables: the quality of connections and the number of connections. Hence, the reputation of an individual is a function of the number and the quality of connections within the network. On the other hand, individuals incur in a cost when they improve their network of contacts. The initial value of the quality and number of connections of each individual is distributed according to an initial (given) distribution. The competition occurs over continuous time and among a continuum of agents. A mean field game approach is adopted to solve the model, leading to an optimal trajectory for the number and quality of connections for each individual.

Brazilian equity risk premium analysis: A macroeconomic approach

Double Degree Masters in Economics Program from Insper and NOVA School of Business and Economics