Brotherly love and filial obedience: the commemorative programme of the Avis princes at Santa Maria da Vitória, Batalha

This dissertation focuses on a rare 15th century commemorative programme that has thus far received little scholarly attention: the collective monument erected in the Founder’s Chapel, at the Monastery of Santa Maria da Vitória, Batalha, to house the remains of four Avis princes, members of what would become known as ‘the Illustrious Generation’. A patron is proposed for the commission of this erudite monument - the princes’ eldest brother, king Duarte I - arguing its integration into a broader propaganda programme to glorify the memory of the Avis dynasty founder, king João I. The dissertation then proceeds to discuss various highly innovative features of the monument, such as its pseudo-architectural character, its use of sophisticated heraldry and personal badges, the apparent absence of religious iconography on the tombs and, importantly, the collective nature of the programme, key to its interpretation. Using a semiotic approach, a discussion is also offered on the way the various formal, iconographic and conceptual novelties of the princes’ monument impacted on the 15th century monumental landscape in Portugal. Finally, the monument and the chapel housing it are looked at through the prism of the various readings that successive generations of viewers have projected onto it, from the time of its creation to the turn of the 20th century, in order to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the object as it stands today.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.