Semantics of logic programs with explicit negation

After a historical introduction, the bulk of the thesis concerns the study of a declarative semantics for logic programs. The main original contributions are: ² WFSX (Well–Founded Semantics with eXplicit negation), a new semantics for logic programs with explicit negation (i.e. extended logic programs), which compares favourably in its properties with other extant semantics. ² A generic characterization schema that facilitates comparisons among a diversity of semantics of extended logic programs, including WFSX. ² An autoepistemic and a default logic corresponding to WFSX, which solve existing problems of the classical approaches to autoepistemic and default logics, and clarify the meaning of explicit negation in logic programs. ² A framework for defining a spectrum of semantics of extended logic programs based on the abduction of negative hypotheses. This framework allows for the characterization of different levels of scepticism/credulity, consensuality, and argumentation. One of the semantics of abduction coincides with WFSX. ² O–semantics, a semantics that uniquely adds more CWA hypotheses to WFSX. The techniques used for doing so are applicable as well to the well–founded semantics of normal logic programs. ² By introducing explicit negation into logic programs contradiction may appear. I present two approaches for dealing with contradiction, and show their equivalence. One of the approaches consists in avoiding contradiction, and is based on restrictions in the adoption of abductive hypotheses. The other approach consists in removing contradiction, and is based in a transformation of contradictory programs into noncontradictory ones, guided by the reasons for contradiction.

From Consciousness to Knowledge – The Explanatory Power of Revelation

Epistemology in philosophy of mind is a difficult endeavor. Those who believe that our phenomenal life is different from other domains suggest that self-knowledge about phenomenal properties is certain and therefore privileged. Usually, this so called privileged access is explained by the idea that we have direct access to our phenomenal life. This means, in contrast to perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is non-inferential. It is widely believed that, this kind of directness involves two different senses: an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. Proponents of this view often claim that this is due to the fact that we are acquainted with our current experiences. The acquaintance thesis, therefore, is the backbone in justifying privileged access. Unfortunately the whole approach has a profound flaw. For the thesis to work, acquaintance has to be a genuine explanation. Since it is usually assumed that any knowledge relation between judgments and the corresponding objects are merely causal and contingent (e.g. in perception), the proponent of the privileged access view needs to show that acquaintance can do the job. In this thesis, however, I claim that the latter cannot be done. Based on considerations introduced by Levine, I conclude that this approach involves either the introduction of ontologically independent properties or a rather obscure knowledge relation. A proper explanation, however, cannot employ either of the two options. The acquaintance thesis is, therefore, bound to fail. Since the privileged access intuition seems to be vital to epistemology within the philosophy of mind, I will explore alternative justifications. After discussing a number of options, I will focus on the so called revelation thesis. This approach states that by simply having an experience with phenomenal properties, one is in the position to know the essence of those phenomenal properties. I will argue that, after finding a solution for the controversial essence claim, this thesis is a successful replacement explanation which maintains all the virtues of the acquaintance account without necessarily introducing ontologically independent properties or an obscure knowledge relation. The overall solution consists in qualifying the essence claim in the relevant sense, leaving us with an appropriate ontology for phenomenal properties. On the one hand, this avoids employing mysterious independent properties, since this ontological view is physicalist in nature. On the other hand, this approach has the right kind of structure to explain privileged self-knowledge of our phenomenal life. My final conclusion consists in the claim that the privileged access intuition is in fact veridical. It cannot, however, be justified by the popular acquaintance approach, but rather, is explainable by the controversial revelation thesis.

In Search of the Origins of Modernism: Venice and the Crisis of Classical Architecture in the mid-eighteenth century

This paper attempts to prove that in the years 1735 to 1755 Venice was the birthplace and cradle of Modern architectural theory, generating a major crisis in classical architecture traditionally based on the Vitruvian assumption that it imitates early wooden structures in stone or in marble. According to its rationalist critics such as the Venetian Observant Franciscan friar and architectural theorist Carlo Lodoli (1690-1761) and his nineteenth-century followers, classical architecture is singularly deceptive and not true to the nature of materials, in other words, dishonest and fallacious. This questioning did not emanate from practising architects, but from Lodoli himself– a philosopher and educator of the Venetian patriciate – who had not been trained as an architect. The roots of this crisis lay in a new approach to architecture stemming from the new rationalist philosophy of the Enlightenment age with its emphasis on reason and universal criticism.