Stops and bonanzas in the EU: Does being part of the Euro Area make a difference?

In this paper, we investigate whether being part of the euro area influences the conditional probability of going through a sudden stop or a bonanza of capital flows. Our sample period is from 1995 until 2014. We identify these two phenomena and we evaluate which push and pull factors help predict the conditional probability of experiencing one of them. We find that most countries had significant capital inflows until 2008 and that there were more sudden stops during the recent financial crisis than in any other moment in our sample. The factors that better help forecast the conditional probability of a sudden stop are global uncertainty (represented by the push factor “Volatility Index”), and the domestic economic activity (pull factors “GDP growth” and “consumer confidence”). An indicator of country risk (pull factor “change in credit rating”) is the most significant one for predicting bonanzas. Ultimately, we find no evidence that being part of the euro area influences the conditional probability of going through a sudden stop or a bonanza.

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Portuguese banks and the economic adjustment programme: balance sheet adjustments and impact on profitability

Double Degree. A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics and a Masters Degree in Finance from Louvain School of Management

O incumprimento do contrato de crédito ao consumo pelo consumidor

Consumer relations, established between the Consumer and the Creditor, which carry a consequent inequality of contractual positioning between the parties, have been pushing the legislator to adopt more rigid regulations with regard to lending for the purchase of goods or services of consum issues. In this sense, the Decree-Law 359/91 was approved, meanwhile repealed by the Decree-Law 133/2009, which regulates the consumer credit agreement’s regime in the portuguese legal system. Through this contract, the financier makes available to the consumer a certain amount of money, which the consumer must repay, plus the respective remuneration (interest) and other charges, according to a refund plan agreed by the parties. The consumer will be in delay if he breaches this stipulation. In case of default, the creditor, notwithstanding, can choose to wait for the performance by the debtor, promote the loss of benefit of the term or the termination of the contract. From the outset it would seem that, in one way or another, the financier, by imposing a forced shortening of the contract duration initially agreed, will lose the right to remuneration for the provision of capital agreed, but not verified. Nevertheless, unlike presently, the previous regime allowed the parties to rule otherwise, being permitted to agree to the payment of interest of outstanding installments. On the other hand, in the consumer credit contract the principle of freedom of contractual provision of the parties is strongly mitigated by the special legislation, which prevents the waiver of rights by the consumer, and by the regime of general contractual terms, which restricts the freedom of the financier to stipulate the contractual content freely and the freedom of the consumer to negotiate. For all these reasons, associated with the growing need of credit resource to satisfy their needs of consumption, it is confirm the relevance of legislative intervention on consumers protection in the context of hiring credit.

O incumprimento do contrato de crédito ao consumo pelo consumidor

Consumer relations, established between the Consumer and the Creditor, which carry a consequent inequality of contractual positioning between the parties, have been pushing the legislator to adopt more rigid regulations with regard to lending for the purchase of goods or services of consum issues. In this sense, the Decree-Law 359/91 was approved, meanwhile repealed by the Decree-Law 133/2009, which regulates the consumer credit agreement’s regime in the portuguese legal system. Through this contract, the financier makes available to the consumer a certain amount of money, which the consumer must repay, plus the respective remuneration (interest) and other charges, according to a refund plan agreed by the parties. The consumer will be in delay if he breaches this stipulation. In case of default, the creditor, notwithstanding, can choose to wait for the performance by the debtor, promote the loss of benefit of the term or the termination of the contract. From the outset it would seem that, in one way or another, the financier, by imposing a forced shortening of the contract duration initially agreed, will lose the right to remuneration for the provision of capital agreed, but not verified. Nevertheless, unlike presently, the previous regime allowed the parties to rule otherwise, being permitted to agree to the payment of interest of outstanding installments. On the other hand, in the consumer credit contract the principle of freedom of contractual provision of the parties is strongly mitigated by the special legislation, which prevents the waiver of rights by the consumer, and by the regime of general contractual terms, which restricts the freedom of the financier to stipulate the contractual content freely and the freedom of the consumer to negotiate. For all these reasons, associated with the growing need of credit resource to satisfy their needs of consumption, it is confirm the relevance of legislative intervention on consumers protection in the context of hiring credit.