Molecular simulation of gas adsorption equilibria in nanoporous materials

This work is divided into two distinct parts. The first part consists of the study of the metal organic framework UiO-66Zr, where the aim was to determine the force field that best describes the adsorption equilibrium properties of two different gases, methane and carbon dioxide. The other part of the work focuses on the study of the single wall carbon nanotube topology for ethane adsorption; the aim was to simplify as much as possible the solid-fluid force field model to increase the computational efficiency of the Monte Carlo simulations. The choice of both adsorbents relies on their potential use in adsorption processes, such as the capture and storage of carbon dioxide, natural gas storage, separation of components of biogas, and olefin/paraffin separations. The adsorption studies on the two porous materials were performed by molecular simulation using the grand canonical Monte Carlo (μ,V,T) method, over the temperature range of 298-343 K and pressure range 0.06-70 bar. The calibration curves of pressure and density as a function of chemical potential and temperature for the three adsorbates under study, were obtained Monte Carlo simulation in the canonical ensemble (N,V,T); polynomial fit and interpolation of the obtained data allowed to determine the pressure and gas density at any chemical potential. The adsorption equilibria of methane and carbon dioxide in UiO-66Zr were simulated and compared with the experimental data obtained by Jasmina H. Cavka et al. The results show that the best force field for both gases is a chargeless united-atom force field based on the TraPPE model. Using this validated force field it was possible to estimate the isosteric heats of adsorption and the Henry constants. In the Grand-Canonical Monte Carlo simulations of carbon nanotubes, we conclude that the fastest type of run is obtained with a force field that approximates the nanotube as a smooth cylinder; this approximation gives execution times that are 1.6 times faster than the typical atomistic runs.

Inefficient commuting in a city with spillovers

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Competition effects from patient mobility in the European Union

This paper studies the effects of reimbursement for medical tourism within the European Union. We use a spatial competition framework to study the effects on prices, qualities and patient flows between two countries. Patient mobility increases with the implementation of reimbursement mechanisms. The resulting equilibria in prices and qualities depend on the rule of reimbursements and possible differences in country specific parameters. Soft budget constraints that public providers may have, pose a competitive advantage over private providers and divert demand toward the former. Supranational coordination concerning soft budgets constraints is needed to address the potentially detrimental effects on aggregate welfar

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).