3 resultados para Knowledge of workers
em RUN (Repositório da Universidade Nova de Lisboa) - FCT (Faculdade de Cienecias e Technologia), Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL), Portugal
Resumo:
This research seeks to design and implement a WebGIS application allowing high school students to work with information related to the disciplinary competencies of the competency-teaching model, in Mexico. This paradigm assumes knowledge to be acquired through the application of new technologies and to link it with everyday life situations of students. The WebGIS provides access to maps regarding natural risks in Mexico, e.g. volcanism, seismic activities, or hurricanes; the prototype's user interface was designed with special emphasis on scholar needs for high school students.
Resumo:
While the work-family relation conflict literature has received much attention, there is a lack of empirical evidence towards work-family positive relation. Furthermore, there is a lack of understanding and recognition of possible benefits obtained by skills’ development during maternity. This study concludes that a family-work relation has a positive outcome, namely the enrichment. It was evident that there is a potential win when women enrich their role as workers through the enrichment of their family lives. Moreover, this enrichment is perceived by mothers along the development of their children; each age and phase have different challenges and enable different skills’ improvement. The findings support the notion that not all work and family experiences are negative and experiences from the work and home can improve outcomes both inside and outside the workplace.
Resumo:
Epistemology in philosophy of mind is a difficult endeavor. Those who believe that our phenomenal life is different from other domains suggest that self-knowledge about phenomenal properties is certain and therefore privileged. Usually, this so called privileged access is explained by the idea that we have direct access to our phenomenal life. This means, in contrast to perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is non-inferential. It is widely believed that, this kind of directness involves two different senses: an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. Proponents of this view often claim that this is due to the fact that we are acquainted with our current experiences. The acquaintance thesis, therefore, is the backbone in justifying privileged access. Unfortunately the whole approach has a profound flaw. For the thesis to work, acquaintance has to be a genuine explanation. Since it is usually assumed that any knowledge relation between judgments and the corresponding objects are merely causal and contingent (e.g. in perception), the proponent of the privileged access view needs to show that acquaintance can do the job. In this thesis, however, I claim that the latter cannot be done. Based on considerations introduced by Levine, I conclude that this approach involves either the introduction of ontologically independent properties or a rather obscure knowledge relation. A proper explanation, however, cannot employ either of the two options. The acquaintance thesis is, therefore, bound to fail. Since the privileged access intuition seems to be vital to epistemology within the philosophy of mind, I will explore alternative justifications. After discussing a number of options, I will focus on the so called revelation thesis. This approach states that by simply having an experience with phenomenal properties, one is in the position to know the essence of those phenomenal properties. I will argue that, after finding a solution for the controversial essence claim, this thesis is a successful replacement explanation which maintains all the virtues of the acquaintance account without necessarily introducing ontologically independent properties or an obscure knowledge relation. The overall solution consists in qualifying the essence claim in the relevant sense, leaving us with an appropriate ontology for phenomenal properties. On the one hand, this avoids employing mysterious independent properties, since this ontological view is physicalist in nature. On the other hand, this approach has the right kind of structure to explain privileged self-knowledge of our phenomenal life. My final conclusion consists in the claim that the privileged access intuition is in fact veridical. It cannot, however, be justified by the popular acquaintance approach, but rather, is explainable by the controversial revelation thesis.