Effect of European Sovereign debt crisis on banks’ stock market performances: application to Portuguese data

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Of Structural Denial: A Narratological Study of the Structural Disintegration of the Novel Form

If an opening to the argument of this dissertation is of imperative necessity, one might tentatively begin with Herbert Quain, born in Roscommon, Ireland, author of the novels The God of the Labyrinth (1933) and April March (1936), the short-story collection Statements (1939), and the play The Secret Mirror (undated). To a certain extent, this idiosyncratic Irish author, who hailed from the ancient province of Connacht, may be regarded as a forerunner of the type of novels which will be considered in this dissertation. Quain was, after all, the unconscious creator of one of the first structurally disintegrated novels in the history of western literature, April March. His first novel, The God of the Labyrinth, also exhibits elements which are characteristic of structurally disintegrated fiction, for it provides the reader with two possible solutions to a mysterious crime. As a matter of fact, one might suggest that Quain’s debut novel offers the reader the possibility to ignore the solution to the crime and carry on living his or her readerly life, turning a blind eye to the novel itself. It may hence be argued that Quain’s first novel is in fact a compound of three different novels. It is self-evident that the structure of Quain’s oeuvre is of an experimental nature, combining geometrical precision with authorial innovation, and one finds in it a higher consideration for formal defiance than for the text itself. In other words, the means of expression are the concern of the author and not, interestingly, the textual content. April March, for example, is a novel which regresses back into itself, its first chapter focussing on an evening which is preceded by three possible evenings which, in turn, are each preceded by three other, dissimilar, possible evenings. It is a novel of backward-movement, and it is due to this process of branching regression that April March contains within itself at least nine possible novels. Structure, therefore, paradoxically controls the text, for it allows the text to expand or contract under its formal limitations. In other words, the formal aspects of the novel, usually associated with the restrictive device of a superior design, contribute to a liberation of the novel’s discourse. It is paradoxical only in the sense that the idea of structure necessarily entails the fixation of a narrative skeleton that determines how plot and discourse interact, something which Quain flouts for the purposes of innovation. In this sense, April March’s convoluted structure allows for multiple readings and interpretations of the same text, consciously germinating narratives within itself, producing different texts from a single, unique source. Thus, text and means of expression are bonded by a structural design that, rather than limiting, liberates the text of the novel.

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.