7 resultados para IT strategic

em RUN (Repositório da Universidade Nova de Lisboa) - FCT (Faculdade de Cienecias e Technologia), Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL), Portugal


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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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This work project takes the format of a problem-solving approach suggested by “Impulse Partners”, a French consulting firm. It recommends a way to measure the success of ten startups in the incubators “Starburst” and “Incubator Construction & Energy” and give them strategic guidance. A Balanced Scorecard is elaborated to help incubated startups building up and implementing their strategy. The Scorecard suggests possible initiatives for the startups that are ideally realized with the help of the consulting firm that is steering the incubator. Special attention is drawn to what the startups need to succeed, which typically concerns financing, networking and managing skills.

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Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

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This thesis is a case study on Corporate Governance and Business Ethics, using the Portuguese Corporate Law as a general setting. The thesis was conducted in Portugal with illustrations on past cases under the Business Judgment Rule of the State of Delaware, U.SA along with illustrations on current cases in Portugal under the Portuguese Judicial setting, along with a comparative analysis between both. A debate is being considered among scholars and executives; a debate on best practices within corporate governance and corporate law, associated with recent discoveries of unlawful investments that lead to the bankruptcy of leading institutions and an aggravation of the crisis in Portugal. The study aimed at learning possible reasons and causes for the current situation of the country’s corporations along with attempts to discover the best way to move forward. From the interviews and analysis conducted, this paper concluded that the corporate governance structure and legal frameworks in Portugal were not the sole influencers behind the actions and decisions of Corporate Executives, nor were they the main triggers for the recent corporate mishaps. But it is rather a combination of different factors that played a significant role, such as cultural and ethical aspects, individual personalities, and others all of which created gray areas beyond the legal structure, which in turn accelerated and aggravated the corporate governance crisis in the country.