The simple economics of risk-sharing agreements between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry

The Janssen-Cilag proposal for a risk-sharing agreement regarding bortezomib received a welcome signal from NICE. The Office of Fair Trading report included risk-sharing agreements as an available tool for the National Health Service. Nonetheless, recent discussions have somewhat neglected the economic fundamentals underlying risk-sharing agreements. We argue here that risk-sharing agreements, although attractive due to the principle of paying by results, also entail risks. Too many patients may be put under treatment even with a low success probability. Prices are likely to be adjusted upward, in anticipation of future risk-sharing agreements between the pharmaceutical company and the third-party payer. An available instrument is a verification cost per patient treated, which allows obtaining the first-best allocation of patients to the new treatment, under the risk sharing agreement. Overall, the welfare effects of risk-sharing agreements are ambiguous, and care must be taken with their use.

Strategic marketing plan for Sant'Anna

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Empirical evidences on voluntary delisting phenomenon

The paper studies what drives firms to voluntary delist from capital markets and what differs in firms’ behavior and fundamentals between public-to-private transactions and M&A deals with listed corporations. Moreover, I study the relationship between ownership percentage in controlling shareholders’ hands and cumulative returns around the delisting public announcement. I perform my tests both for the Italian and the US markets and I compare the findings to better understand how the phenomenon works in these different institutional environments. Consistent with my expectations, I find that the likelihood of delisting is mainly related to size, underperformance and undervaluation, while shareholders are more rewarded when their companies are involved in PTP transactions than in M&As with public firms.

Comparative analysis of Spanish Banks’ Standalone credit profile

The paper studies the relationship between four differently rated bank’s financial profile and their standalone credit rating issued by Moody’s. The comparative analysis shows an example that despite their pricing power and geographical coverage, larger banks do not necessarily have better credit ratings. Instead, business model and risk appetite seem to be the defining factors of banks’ vulnerability to shocks, such as the Spanish real estate crisis. The risk-return relationship is also identified in the banks’ fundamentals meaning that while expansionary strategy in riskier asset classes enhances margins, it also potentially distorts the credit risk profile.