An agent-based simulator to estimate domestic energy use

Throughout recent years, there has been an increase in the population size, as well as a fast economic growth, which has led to an increase of the energy demand that comes mainly from fossil fuels. In order to reduce the ecological footprint, governments have implemented sustainable measures and it is expected that by 2035 the energy produced from renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar would be responsible for one-third of the energy produced globally. However, since the energy produced from renewable sources is governed by the availability of the respective primary energy source there is often a mismatch between production and demand, which could be solved by adding flexibility on the demand side through demand response (DR). DR programs influence the end-user electricity usage by changing its cost along the time. Under this scenario the user needs to estimate the energy demand and on-site production in advance to plan its energy demand according to the energy price. This work focuses on the development of an agent-based electrical simulator, capable of: (a) estimating the energy demand and on-site generation with a 1-min time resolution for a 24-h period, (b) calculating the energy price for a given scenario, (c) making suggestions on how to maximize the usage of renewable energy produced on-site and to lower the electricity costs by rescheduling the use of certain appliances. The results show that this simulator allows reducing the energy bill by 11% and almost doubling the use of renewable energy produced on-site.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Understanding churn and its reasons: The GuestU case

In the age of computerisation, entrepreneurs around the world aim to revolutionise their field with ground-breaking ICTs. GuestU is one of those offering mobile application development to small and medium-sized tourism enterprises. To assure the young start-ups steady growth this paper aims to identify reasons for the high customer churn risk. Primary data is used to analyse end-user behaviour and particularly the success of acquisition and activation. Results show troubling download quantities as well as retention rates leading to the recommendations for GuestU to incentivise and guide their customers in increasing promotion for the applications.