Electoral opportunism and fiscal policy before and after the EMU

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Electoral observation: Evidence from Mozambique

Electoral fraud is a common problem in young democracies. Election observers constitute one possible remedy. Yet, quantitative evidence of the exact effects of observers is scarce. Data on the random assignment of observers during Mozambique’s 2009 general elections is used to estimate the impact that observers have on ballot fraud. It is shown that the presence of national observers reduces high levels of turnout and manipulation of ballots. The findings contribute to the understanding of the behavior of politicians and have implications for the implementation of observer missions.

Fiscal dynamics and electoral behavior in the Eurozone

Abstract: The Stability Growth Pact and the 3% rule did not prevent countries from running large deficits. Countries in the EMU administrate fiscal policies differently, despite the existence of a common quantitative goal. The main focus of this work project is to study differences in the fiscal dynamics of eight EMU countries and assess the role of political variables in shaping those dynamics. We find that elections negatively affect government revenue in Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Germany. Expenditure, on the other hand, responds positively to incoming elections in Portugal, Italy, France and Netherlands, and negatively in the case of Germany.