Determinants of reelection in Portuguese municipal elections

This Work Project investigates the determinants of reelection using data on the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1976-2009. We implement a logit fixed effect model to control for the municipalities��� unobserved characteristics that remain constant over time. Political variables, such as the vote share of the incumbent���s party in previous election, the number of mayor���s consecutive mandates and abstention rate, are found to be relevant in explaining incumbent���s reelection. Moreover, as to the mayor���s individual characteristics, age and education contribute to explain reelection prospects. We also provide weak evidence that a higher degree of fiscal autonomy increases political turnover and that the good economic prospects of the municipality positively affect reelection. Finally, the residents��� level of education and the size of the municipal population have an explanatory power on mayor���s reelection. We perform several robustness checks to confirm these results.

Electoral opportunism and fiscal policy before and after the EMU

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA ��� School of Business and Economics

Health expenditures in the OECD: A political economy analysis using structural breaks

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA ��� School of Business and Economics

Going twice to the polls?: Optimality of two-stage voting procedures

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA ��� School of Business and Economics

Elei����es municipais em Lisboa na Primeira Rep��blica (19910-1926)

Esta tese investiga as elei����es municipais em Lisboa durante a Primeira Rep��blica (1910-1926). Pretende-se captar perman��ncias e mudan��as neste microcosmo pol��tico, para um conhecimento aprofundado da Hist��ria eleitoral e local desta ��poca. Estuda, uma a uma, as elei����es municipais em Lisboa (1913, 1917, 1919, 1922 e 1925). Pesquisa as for��as partid��rias, os candidatos a vereadores, a campanha pol��tica, o corpo eleitoral e o resultado da vota����o para cada um dos escrut��nios. No cap��tulo final faz-se an��lise de todos os sufr��gios, averiguando a quest��o da legitima����o do poder municipal em Lisboa na Primeira Rep��blica. Conclu��mos que as ���elei����es feitas��� ditaram a hegemonia do Partido Republicano Portugu��s em todas as elei����es camar��rias da capital. Apesar disso, o regime republicano empenhou-se na participa����o pol��tica, na cultura c��vica e no processo de moderniza����o e democratiza����o da sociedade portuguesa.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & C��rte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

US fiscal dynamics in political perspective

Given the importance of fiscal balance for ensuring a sustainable fiscal policy, we conduct an empirical examination of fiscal dynamics in the United States in response to unsustainable budget deviations. We concentrate on the role of political factors, namely the Republican - Democrat presidential divide, in determining the fiscal response to budget disequilibria. Making use of an asymmetric cointegration framework, we explore politically motivated fiscal asymmetries in the US, from Eisenhower to Obama. We conclude that political factors such as the government���s political quadrant and the timing of elections are important determinants of the fiscal response to unsustainable budget deviations.

Electoral observation: Evidence from Mozambique

Electoral fraud is a common problem in young democracies. Election observers constitute one possible remedy. Yet, quantitative evidence of the exact effects of observers is scarce. Data on the random assignment of observers during Mozambique���s 2009 general elections is used to estimate the impact that observers have on ballot fraud. It is shown that the presence of national observers reduces high levels of turnout and manipulation of ballots. The findings contribute to the understanding of the behavior of politicians and have implications for the implementation of observer missions.

Fiscal dynamics and electoral behavior in the Eurozone

Abstract: The Stability Growth Pact and the 3% rule did not prevent countries from running large deficits. Countries in the EMU administrate fiscal policies differently, despite the existence of a common quantitative goal. The main focus of this work project is to study differences in the fiscal dynamics of eight EMU countries and assess the role of political variables in shaping those dynamics. We find that elections negatively affect government revenue in Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Germany. Expenditure, on the other hand, responds positively to incoming elections in Portugal, Italy, France and Netherlands, and negatively in the case of Germany.

As Comiss��es Parlamentares de Inqu��rito no Portugal democr��tico, 1976-2015

As transforma����es operadas no mundo contempor��neo, em especial no que respeita ��s estruturas do poder, �� sua maior autonomiza����o e diferencia����o, tiveram particulares reflexos ao n��vel dos Parlamentos e das fun����es que prosseguem. Desde a sua origem, no passado s��culo XIII, �� atualidade, grandes acontecimentos, clivagens e factos hist��ricos est��o presentes na sua linha evolutiva. A democratiza����o do regime parlamentar e a legitimidade outorgada atrav��s de elei����es democr��ticas e concorrenciais s��o um marco ��mpar na sua hist��ria. A complexidade das sociedades hodiernas catapultou o Poder Executivo em detrimento do Parlamento, enquanto ��rg��o legislativo por excel��ncia. Tal circunstancialismo levou, n��o ao proclamado decl��nio dos Parlamentos, mas a reformas estruturantes. Outras e mais importantes fun����es seriam prosseguidas. Se as iniciativas legislativas e a defini����o das pol��ticas p��blicas passaram a ser quase um exclusivo do Governo, havia que desenvolver e ampliar, por parte dos Parlamentos, os instrumentos de controlo, fiscaliza����o e escrut��nio da a����o governativa. Entre os cl��ssicos instrumentos de controlo avulta o Inqu��rito Parlamentar, materializado em Comiss��es Parlamentares de Inqu��rito, dotadas de poderes especiais para recolha de informa����o e para investiga����o. No seu percurso parlamentar, tamb��m as Comiss��es de Inqu��rito foram sendo alvo de constantes aperfei��oamentos, de ordem constitucional, legal e regimental. A excessiva partidariza����o da atividade parlamentar de outrora e sobretudo a confus��o entre o governo e o partido que o sustentava a n��vel parlamentar, o confronto desequilibrado de meios entre as maiorias e as minorias, levaram a um reposicionamento do inqu��rito parlamentar enquanto garante do direito das minorias. N��o sendo expect��vel que as grandes iniciativas de controlo sejam tomadas pelo partido maiorit��rio, cabe �� oposi����o esse papel. Em Portugal, diminuta era a tradi����o do instituto do inqu��rito parlamentar, raz��o porque foi ef��mera e sem resultado a sua utiliza����o no tempo da monarquia constitucional. O regime democr��tico, abra��ado com o 25 de abril de 1974, relan��ou o ��rg��o de soberania Parlamento e estabeleceu prioridades. At�� ao amadurecimento da democracia viveram-se tempos mais conturbados mas de grande aprendizagem. O inqu��rito Parlamentar, a partir da revis��o constitucional de 1982, passou conceptualmente a integrar um dos meios mais relevantes da fiscaliza����o pol��tica. ��, pois, o levantamento exaustivo e a an��lise das Comiss��es Parlamentares de Inqu��rito no Portugal democr��tico, per��odo de 1976-2015, o objetivo a que nos propomos neste estudo.

As peculiaridades da democratiza����o da regi��o do C��ucaso do Sul no contexto da Pol��tica Europeia de Vizinhan��a

O per��odo ap��s o colapso da Uni��o Sovi��tica foi o tempo da procura de novas identidades na nova realidade e de escolha de novos parceiros e aliados, o tempo da constru����o de novos estados e de formula����o das regras e normas nacionais. Ap��s o desmoronamento da ideologia sovi��tica - um facto reconhecido oficialmente durante o per��odo da Perestroika ���, as pessoas sentiram uma necessidade de preencher o v��cuo ideol��gico e desenvolver uma nova identidade. Foi proclamada a rejei����o da estrutura pol��tica administrativa herdada da Uni��o Sovi��tica e do sistema de economia planificada, e desenvolvida a tend��ncia para a constru����o do estado democr��tico fundado numa economia de mercado. As expectativas relativas ��s transforma����es no per��odo p��s-sovi��tico estavam relacionadas com o Ocidente (EUA e UE), e a constru����o do estado soberano foi fundada em modelos ocidentais de estado de direito, ���boa governan��a��� e a economia de mercado. A UE desempenhou um papel importante na democratiza����o dos estados da regi��o do Sul do C��ucaso atrav��s de v��rios projetos e programas bilaterais e multilaterais no ��mbito da Pol��tica Europeia de Vizinhan��a e da Parceria Oriental. Embora as reformas democr��ticas tenham sido realizadas com vista ao estabelecimento de uma Constitui����o democr��tica, �� implementa����o de elei����es democr��ticas e ao desenvolvimento da sociedade civil, fortaleceram, tamb��m, ainda mais, a natureza autorit��ria do poder, impediram a cria����o de um estado de direito, refor��aram viola����o dos direitos e das liberdades humanas. (NODIYA, 2003: 30; BAKHMAN, 2003: 17; BADALOV, 2003: 20). Deste modo, o processo da promo����o da democracia atrav��s das reformas nos tr��s estados do Sul do C��ucaso conduziu �� cria����o de estados de ���conte��do autocr��tico misto, mas de forma democr��tica��� (CHETERYAN, 2003: 41). Embora seja poss��vel identificar as semelhan��as entre os tr��s estados da regi��o do Sul do C��ucaso nas reformas do processo de desenvolvimento, os m��todos e meios de implementa����o de reformas nas realidades dos estados regionais pela administra����o nacional foram bastante diferentes, por raz��es associadas ��s especificidades de cada um (DELCOUR e WOLCZUK, 2013: 3). Cada pa��s �� caracterizado pelas suas peculiaridades ao n��vel da situa����o geopol��tica e diversidade do potencial econ��mico ��� fatores que definem a trajet��ria pol��tica e econ��mica do estado no per��odo p��s-sovi��tico e, em certa medida, influenciam o modo como se desenvolvem as rela����es com a UE e, portanto, o processo de ado����o das reformas e a sua introdu����o a n��vel nacional.