Health expenditures in the OECD: A political economy analysis using structural breaks

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Campanha negativa nas eleições legislativas de 2011: uma análise do discurso político

Esta dissertação pretende observar o fenómeno das campanhas negativas nas eleições portuguesas, usando como caso de estudo a campanha eleitoral das eleições legislativas de 2011. Procurou-se analisar o discurso político dos partidos nesta campanha eleitoral, recorrendo à análise de conteúdo. Para apoiar a interpretação dos resultados foram realizadas entrevistas aos directores de campanha ou outros actores políticos com um papel relevante na definição e implementação da estratégia eleitoral do BE, CDU, CDS, PS e PSD. Os resultados indicam que a campanha eleitoral de 2011 foi essencialmente positiva: a maior parte do discurso dos partidos focou-se na apresentação e defesa das suas ideias, programas e qualidades e não na crítica aos adversários. As campanhas negativas incidiram sobretudo sobre conteúdos políticos e os ataques não foram personalizados. Os resultados indicam ainda que as teorias que explicam a utilização de campanhas negativas noutros países não se aplicam em Portugal. Segundo os entrevistados, apesar do confronto de ideias ser essencial, as campanhas negativas não resultam em Portugal, ao contrário do que acontece noutros países.

Determinants of reelection in Portuguese municipal elections

This Work Project investigates the determinants of reelection using data on the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1976-2009. We implement a logit fixed effect model to control for the municipalities’ unobserved characteristics that remain constant over time. Political variables, such as the vote share of the incumbent’s party in previous election, the number of mayor’s consecutive mandates and abstention rate, are found to be relevant in explaining incumbent’s reelection. Moreover, as to the mayor’s individual characteristics, age and education contribute to explain reelection prospects. We also provide weak evidence that a higher degree of fiscal autonomy increases political turnover and that the good economic prospects of the municipality positively affect reelection. Finally, the residents’ level of education and the size of the municipal population have an explanatory power on mayor’s reelection. We perform several robustness checks to confirm these results.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Electoral observation: Evidence from Mozambique

Electoral fraud is a common problem in young democracies. Election observers constitute one possible remedy. Yet, quantitative evidence of the exact effects of observers is scarce. Data on the random assignment of observers during Mozambique’s 2009 general elections is used to estimate the impact that observers have on ballot fraud. It is shown that the presence of national observers reduces high levels of turnout and manipulation of ballots. The findings contribute to the understanding of the behavior of politicians and have implications for the implementation of observer missions.

Portugal no conselho de segurança das Nações Unidas

The United Nations is an international organization that was created after World War II, whose main objective is to promote cooperation, social and economic development, as well as to ensure international peace and security. The Member States are key actors in the international political system. For that reason they have strategic interests in what regards taking part in the international organizations. They see it as an opportunity to achieve those goals. The United Nations Security Council has a very important role in preserving international peace and security. It is the organ of the United Nations in which fifteen member states are represented: five permanently and ten non-permanently, being that the latter are elected for two years. Participating in the Security Council is a unique opportunity for middle powers like Portugal to promote their national interests and to increase their international visibility. In addition, they can contribute to the world’s destiny during their mandate period. Portugal has exercised his third term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2011-2012 biennium, defeating Canada after a successful campaign carried out by the Portuguese diplomacy. This study analyses the participation of Portugal in the Security Council´s 2011-2012 biennium. It will focus the application process and election and the role of Portugal in the Security Council, especially in its the presidency and its intervention in the presidency of the Sanctions Committee on Libya. Its aim is to show the impact of Portuguese participation in the Security Council for international peace and security, as well as the geopolitical importance for the country of being part of the Security Council.